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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce 
entered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah on October 2, 1992. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(h) 
(1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court abused its discretion in ordering Mr. 
Brooks to pay one-half of the minor child's prospective private 
school expenses and in entering judgment against Mr. Brooks for 
one-half of all private school expenses incurred on behalf of the 
minor child from and after the date of the filing of the Amended 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. 
2. Whether the court abused its discretion in finding that 
Mr. Brooks has a financial ability to assist Mrs. Nunley in paying 
private school expenses for and on behalf of the minor child in 
addition to paying his regular child support payments. 
3. Whether or not the court erred, as a matter of law, in 
determining that it did not have the authority to apply the Social 
Security benefits received by Mrs. Nunley on behalf of the minor 
child by reason of Mr. Brooks* permanent disability toward 
satisfaction of his past and ongoing obligation to pay one-half of 
Michelle's private school expenses. 
4. Whether the court abused its discretion in considering 
evidence submitted by Mrs. Nunley relating to amounts incurred by 
her for the medical and dental expenses and private school expenses 
for the parties' minor child after trial without allowing Mr. 
Brooks opportunity for hearing and cross-examination. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7. Determination of amount of support -
Rebuttable guidelines. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount 
granted by prior court order unless there has been a 
material change of circumstance on the part of the 
obligor or obligee. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the 
guidelines, the court shall establish support after 
considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee 
for the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 Determination of gross income - Imputed 
income. 
(8) (b) Social Security benefits received by a child due 
to the earnings of a parent may be credited as child 
support to the parent upon whose earning record it is 
based, by crediting the amount against the potential 
obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a 
child may be considered as income to a parent depending 
upon the circumstances of each case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were granted a divorce by the Superior Court of 
California, County of Los Angeles, in approximately August of 1985. 
The California Decree of Divorce provided that the parties were 
2 
awarded joint legal and physical custody of their minor child, 
Michelle, with the plaintiff to have primary physical custody. The 
court ordered Mr. Brooks to pay Mrs. Nunley child support in the 
amount of $300 per month and ordered Mrs. Nunley to pay $100 per 
month to Mr. Brooks during any month in which the minor child 
resided with Mr. Brooks for sixteen or more days. In addition, 
Mrs. Nunley was ordered to pay the costs of transporting 
the minor child to and from her visitation with Mr. Brooks. 
Originally, in June of 1988, the plaintiff brought a Petition 
for Modification of Foreign Divorce Decree on the sole issue of 
which party was to bear the expense of the transportation of the 
minor child from Utah, where Mrs. Nunley resided, to Montana where 
Mr. Brooks had moved. Mr. Brooks filed a counter-motion for 
modification seeking to enforce his rights of visitation and for a 
judgment against the plaintiff for unpaid transportation costs 
under the California Decree. In approximately November of 1988, 
Mrs. Nunley filed an Amended Petition for Modification of Foreign 
Divorce Decree, and, in addition to the foregoing, she requested 
increased child support and an order requiring the defendant to pay 
for one-half of Michelle's medical expenses, including insurance 
premiums, and one-half of all of Michelle's private school tuition, 
costs and expenses. 
The case went to trial on April 22, 1991, and the court 
entered its Minute Entry on or about April 26, 1991, wherein, among 
other things, Mr. Brooks was ordered to pay one-half of the private 
school expenses of the minor child and the court ordered that 
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judgment be entered against him lor any arrearages for such 
expenses. The court also ruled that Mr. Brooks was entitled to a 
credit towards his obligation to pay private school expenses for 
Social Security benefits paid to the minor child as a result of Mr. 
Brooks ' disability. 
Thereafter, Mrs. Nunley filed a Motion for Clarification of 
Ruling and for In-Camera Interview to which Mr. Brooks objected. 
There followed a series of post-trial motions by both parties which 
are more particularly described below. These motions included 
submission by Mrs. Nunley of financial information relating to 
amounts she had incurred for the minor child's medical expenses and 
private school expenses which she had not introduced at trial, and 
Mr. Brooks' objection thereto on the basis that either the evidence 
was barred by her failure to introduce it at trial, or he was 
entitled to a hearing on the new information at which he could 
cross-examine Mrs. Nunley and raise objections relating to the 
evidence. 
In the course of considering the post-trial motions of the 
parties and the objections thereto, Judge Moffat changed the ruling 
made in his Minute Entry of April, 1991 so that the final Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce does not allow Mr. Brooks to apply 
amounts received by the minor child as a result of his permanent 
disability to his obligation to pay one-half of her private school 
expenses. Mr. Brooks argued that without applying those payments, 
he was financially unable to pay a portion of private school 
expenses. 
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Over all of Mr. Brooks1 objections, the Order Modifying Decree 
of Divorce was entered by the court on October 2, 1992 wherein Mr, 
Brooks is required to pay one-half of the minor child's private 
school expenses without any credit for the child's Social Security 
benefits and wherein judgment was entered against him in the amount 
of $11,792.06 for arrearages in medical, dental and private school 
expenses. There were no post-judgment motions filed, and Mr. 
Brooks filed his Notice of Appeal on Monday, November 2, 1992. 
Mrs. Brooks filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on November 13, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce 
entered in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of 
Los Angeles, on or about August 14, 1985. The parties were awarded 
joint legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, 
Michelle Nohealani Brooks, born September 18, 1980. (See plain-
tiff's Exhibit 6 and Trial transcript p. 4.) Mr. Brooks was 
ordered to pay Mrs. Nunley child support in the amount of $300 per 
month. If the minor child resided with Mr. Brooks for sixteen or 
more days in any month, Mrs. Nunley was ordered to pay Mr. Brooks 
child support in the amount of $100 for that month. (See 
plaintiff's Exhibit 6) Mrs. Nunley was ordered to pay the 
transportation expenses associated with Mr. Brooks' visitation. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 and Trial transcript p. 5) Immediately 
thereafter, Mrs. Nunley moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, and some 
time later Mr. Brooks moved to Montana. (R. 3-15) 
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2. On or about June 27, 1988, Mrs. Nunley filed her Petition 
for Modification of Foreign Decree, wherein she requested an order 
of court modifying the California Decree as it related to her 
obligation to pay transportation costs associated with the minor 
child's traveling from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles for visitation 
with Mr. Brooks. (R. 2-9) At the time of entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, Mrs. Nunley received free and/or discounted air travel 
through her employment with TWA. (R. 4) She alleged that since 
there were no TWA flights between Salt Lake City and Montana and 
therefore no flight benefits, there had been a substantial change 
of circumstances upon which the court should modify the Decree of 
Divorce. (R. 5) 
3. Mr. Brooks brought a counter-petition for modification 
denying that Mrs. Nunley was entitled to the relief requested and 
seeking an order requiring Mrs. Nunley to comply with the visita-
tion provisions of the Decree and her obligation to pay the travel 
expenses associated with that visitation. (R. 15-20) 
4. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, (R. 44) the 
plaintiff amended her Petition to Modify Foreign Decree on or about 
November 23, 1988. To the previous claim for relief, Mrs. Nunley 
sought a court order requiring Mr. Brooks to pay for one-half of 
Michelle's medical and dental expenses, one-half of private school 
tuition, costs, and expenses and seeking a court order increasing 
Mr. Brooks' child support of $300 per month under the California 
Decree to an amount commensurate with the applicable child support 
guidelines. (R. 34-43) 
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5. The case came on for trial on April 22, 1991- (R. 218) 
6. At the time the parties were divorced, Mr. Brooks was 
employed by the Los Angeles Police Department. As of June, 1985, 
Mr. Brooks was honorably and medically retired from the police 
department. (Trial transcript p. 84) At the time of trial, Mr. 
Brooks had a disease of the thyroid, an ulcer disease and a heart 
disease. (Trial transcript p. 87) In January of 1991, Mr. Brooks 
had a heart attack, (Trial transcript p. 88) and he suffered from 
post-traumatic stress syndrome resulting, at least in part, from 
two work-related helicopter crashes. (Trial transcript pp. 89-91) 
At the time of trial, Mr. Brooks was on numerous medications 
including nitroglycerin, Cortisone, Sinequan, Zanex, Halcion, 
Codeine and Fiovinal (Trial transcript p. 92). 
7. Mr. Brooks testified that the heart problem restricted 
his ability to work (Trial transcript p. 90), and his income 
consisted of $2,332.26 per month from the Los Angeles City Pension 
Plan and $697.00 per month in Social Security disability benefits. 
(See defendant's Exhibit 6.) 
8. Mrs. Nunley attempted to establish that Mr. Brooks' 
income was in excess of the $3,029.26 outlined above based upon, in 
part, his ownership of a Ferrari automobile purchased in 1986 and 
the significant deposits to his checking account from May 16 of 
1988 to July 17 of 1990 in the amount of $173,650.68. However, all 
of these monies were accounted for by Mr. Brooks as follows: 
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BROOKS V. BROOKS 
REBUTTAL OF ALLEGED DEFENDANT'S INCOME 
Deposits to checking account (5/16/88 - 7/17/90) 
Less proceeds from defendant's sale of home 
in Los Angeles 
Less proceeds from defendant's second 
mortgage loan from Ronnie Hansen 
Less credit card advances (5/16/88 - 7/17/90) 
Less loans from defendant's family-
Brother 
Father 
Adjusted Balance (5/16/88 - 7/17/90) 
$173,650.68 
- 43,649.91 
- 15,000.00 
- 17,687.59 
- 2,025.50 
- 23,000.00 
$ 72,287.68 
Less Pension Income 
5/88 to 7/88 - 1,916.88 x 3 
8/88 to 7/89 - 1,992.77 x 12 
8/89 to 7/90 - 2,077.23 x 12 
- 5,750.64 
- 23,913.24 
- 24,926.76 
$ 17,697.04 
Less Pension adjustment check 
Insurance payment 
Security wages 
Tax refunds 
Trout (food reimbursement) 
Insurance medicine (reimbursement) 
Less 6/15/90 Pension adjustment check 
- 4,000.00 
- 3,462.00 
789.00 
750.00 
- 1,051.00 
$ 7,646.04 
- 5,346.23 
$ 2,299.81 
(See Defendant's Exhibit 11) 
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9. Mrs. Nunley had voluntarily terminated her employment with 
Delta Airlines in June of 1989, (Trial transcript pp. 13 and 13-21) 
and at the time of trial, she was self-employed designing, 
manufacturing, and distributing costumes as Nunley, Inc. (Trial 
transcript p. 15) 
10. Mrs. Nunley testified that she took no salary from the 
business from 1989 through 1991 except $2,000 in 1989 and that all 
monies received were reimbursement for expenses incurred. (Trial 
transcript p. 16) She was willing to stipulate that, for purposes 
of calculating child support, her income was $800 per month. 
(Trial transcript p. 17) 
11. The tax return filed by Nunley, Inc. in 1990 showed gross 
receipts in the amount of $221,120.00 and a net profit of $4,493.00 
on which the corporation was taxed. (Defendant's Exhibit 12 and 
Trial transcript p. 63) 
12. At the time of trial, Mrs. Nunley was receiving child 
support in the amount of $300 per month. In addition, Mrs. Nunley 
was receiving Social Security disability payments for and on behalf 
of the parties' minor child as a result of Mr. Brooks' disability. 
She had received a lump sum payment of $6,000 and was receiving 
$345.00 per month. (Trial transcript pp. 55-56) Mrs. Nunley 
testified that she was not spending this money because she was 
concerned that Social Security would recall it if they found out 
Mr. Brooks was not really disabled. (Trial transcript pp. 60-62) 
Mrs. Nunley admitted she had no evidence to support her concern, 
and that it was just a suspicion. (Trial transcript p. 62) 
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13. Mrs. Nunley and her second husband had historically earned 
the following amounts: (See Defendant's Exhibit 3) 
BROOKS vs. BROOKS 
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S YEARLY INCOME -
YEAR 
1986 Joint Tax Return 
JOINT TAX RETURNS 
SOURCE 
Husband - W-2 
Wife - W-2 
Interest 
Dividends 
Refunds 
TOTAL 
$53,272, 
$23,038, 
$ 1,693, 
$ 652, 
$ 1,919, 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
$80,574.00 
1987 Tax Return Husband - W-2 
Wife - W-2 
Interest 
Refunds 
$63,259.05 
$38,499.95 
$ 1,552.00 
$ 1,272.00 
$94,483.00 
1988 Tax Return Husband - W-2 
Wife - W-2 
Dividends 
Refunds 
$63,239.45 
$26,020.55 
$ 1,029.00 
$ 532.00 
$90,821.00 
1989 Tax Return Husband - W-
Wife - W-2 
Interest 
Dividends 
Refund 
$74, 
$11, 
$ 
$ 1 
$ 1 
797 
299 
399 
101 
649 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
$89,245.00 
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14. During their marriage, the parties sent Michelle to a 
private school in California called Westchester Lutheran School 
when she was three and four years old. (Trial Transcript p. 22) 
Several weeks after the parties were divorced in August, 1985, Mrs. 
Nunley remarried and moved to Salt Lake City where she enrolled 
Michelle at Rowland Hall-St. Mark's private school. (Trial 
transcript p. 104) 
15. Mrs. Nunley unilaterally made the decision to send 
Michelle to private school in Utah without discussing it with Mr. 
Brooks. (Trial transcript pp. 42-43 and 105-105) At no time did 
Mrs. Nunley request Mr. Brooks pay for half of the expenses 
associated therewith until her filing of the Amended Petition to 
Modify in or about November, 1988. (Trial transcript p. 103-105) 
16. Without credit for the disability payments being received 
by Michelle, Mr. Brooks asserted he was financially unable to pay 
a portion of Michelle's private school expenses. (Transcript of 
March 9, 1992 hearing pp. 5-9 and R. 780-786) 
17. After trial, the court entered its Minute Entry on or 
about April 26, 1992 wherein, among other things, the court ruled 
as follows: 
a. While expressing concern that neither party fully 
disclosed their income, the court found that Mrs. Nunley's 
current monthly income was $900.00 per month and Mr. Brooks' 
monthly income was $3,029.00 per month. The court denied Mrs. 
Nunley's request for increased child support, finding that the 
$300 required under the California Decree was in excess of the 
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$252 per month provided for pursuant to the Utah Child Support 
Guidelines. 
b, The court ordered that the parties share equally in the 
cost of transportation of the minor child for visitation, and 
ordered Mrs. Nunley to reimburse Mr. Brooks for one-half of 
his transportation costs reasonably incurred in exercising his 
visitation rights. 
c. The court ordered each party to pay one-half of the 
private school tuition, books and supplies, school activities 
and school uniforms of the minor child. The court found that 
this obligation should not extend to the child1s extracurricu-
lar activities. The court ruled that the amount being paid to 
Mrs. Nunley on behalf of the minor child by Social Security as 
a result of Mr. Brooks' permanent disability should be applied 
against his obligation to pay private school expenses. The 
court ordered that judgment be entered against the defendant 
in an amount to reimburse the plaintiff for private school 
costs incurred after giving Mr. Brooks this credit. 
f. Each party was ordered to pay their own attorney's fees 
incurred in maintaining this action. (R. 221-227) 
18. Thereafter, on or about June 6, 1991, Mrs. Nunley brought 
a Motion for Clarification of Ruling and for In-Camera Interview. 
In this motion, Mrs. Nunley alleged that the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by Mr. Brooks' counsel did not 
conform with the court's Minute Entry. In addition, although 
listing no details, Mrs. Nunley alleged that certain issues needed 
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to be clarified and that the court should conduct an in-camera 
interview with the parties1 minor child with respect to that 
summer's visitation because the parties were unable to communicate 
on the issue between themselves. (R. 292-294) 
19. Mr. Brooks objected to Mrs. Nunley's motion, arguing in 
favor of the proposed findings and conclusions submitted to Mrs. 
Nunley's counsel and pointing out that her assertions as to issues 
needing clarification were totally without support or specifics. 
Finally, Mr. Brooks objected to the in-camera interview on the 
basis that the issue of summer visitation was not properly before 
the court. He sought an award of attorney's fees for the necessity 
of responding to the motion. (R. 302-305) 
20. Mrs. Nunley filed a response to the effect that the motion 
was necessary based upon the "grave differences" in the parties' 
interpretation of the April 26, 1991 Minute Entry. (R. 306-308) 
21. Mrs. Nunley's Motion for Clarification came before the 
court for oral argument on August 7, 1991. (The transcript of this 
hearing is located at R. pp. 419-482) After arguing numerous 
issues, the court decided to allow Mrs. Nunley to submit a motion 
to amend the court's ruling pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration on the following issues: 
a. Whether or not the court's ruling on application of 
the minor child's Social Security benefits to defendant's 
obligation to pay private school costs was appropriate. (R. 
459-460) 
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b. The amounts paid by Mrs, Nunley for tuition, books, 
activities and uniforms for private school for the minor child 
for which she was seeking reimbursement. (R. 469-471) 
c. The court agreed that in his April 26th Minute Entry 
the court had failed to address Mrs. Nunley1s claim for one-
half of medical expenses incurred on behalf of the minor 
child. The court allowed her to submit additional evidence as 
to her medical expenses incurred. (R. 474-476) 
22. The court specifically allowed counsel for Mr. Brooks 
sufficient time to respond to plaintiff's motion to allow him to 
conduct discovery on these issues if necessary. The court granted 
Mr. Brooks 30 days to respond, but in no event was he required to 
respond sooner than September 6, 1991. (R. 459-461) 
23. Counsel for Mr. Brooks expressly reserved his objection to 
the submission of additional documentary evidence of expenses 
incurred by Mrs. Nunley on the basis that such evidence was not 
timely presented at trial. (R. 477) 
24. Finally, at the August 9th hearing, the court ruled that 
the expenses which each party was ordered to reimburse the other 
would begin to accrue as of the date of the filing of the amended 
petition, and not from the date of the Decree of Divorce. (R. 487) 
25. When Mrs. Nunley failed to file this motion, to amend in 
a timely manner, Mr. Brooks filed his Motion to Strike Plaintiff's 
Reserved Issues from Motion for Clarification, Sanctions and 
Attorneys Fees on or about September 16, 1991. (R. 376-379 and 
388-382). The court denied the motion on or about November 8, 1991. 
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26. Over the objections of Mr. Brooks, the court entered its 
written order relating to the August 9th hearing prepared by Mrs. 
Nunley1s attorney on or about December 3, 1991. (R. 737-746) 
27. Prior to entry of this order on the rulings made in the 
August hearing, counsel for Mrs. Nunley submitted her Motion for 
Post-Trial Determination of Divorce Modification Issues on or about 
November 1, 1991, almost two months after the time set forth by the 
court for Mrs. Nunley to file the motion and for Mr. Liapis to 
respond. (R. 527) Attached as Exhibit "C" to the motion was the 
Affidavit of JoAnne Nunley to which was attached over one hundred 
pages of purported documentation supporting her claim for one-half 
of $47,490.95 in private school expenses. (R. 548-657) Attached 
as Exhibit "D" to the plaintiff's motion was the Affidavit of 
JoAnne Nunley relating to her claim for medical and dental 
expenses. (R. 658) To this affidavit was attached fifty nine 
pages of documentation to support Mrs. Nunley*s claim for one-half 
of $2,994.00. (R. 658-720) 
28. On or about December 6, 1991, Mr. Brooks filed his 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial 
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues relating primarily to 
the court's authority to apply Michelle's Social Security benefits 
to Mr. Brooks' obligation to pay one-half of her private school 
expenses. (R. 747-753) 
29. On December 16, 1991, Mr. Brooks filed a supplement to his 
primary memorandum in opposition, (R. 777) and on December 17, 
1991, Mr. Brooks filed his Answer to Plaintiff's Motion for Post-
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trial Determination and in Support of his Motion for Attorneyfs 
Fees. (R. 780) Among the defenses listed in these documents were 
the following: 
a. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (8)(b) 
(1992) a court is given discretion in deciding whether or 
not Social Security benefits received by a child due to 
the earnings of a parent should be credited to that 
parent's child support obligation. (R. 777) 
b. Mr. Brooks argued that Mrs. Nunley's motion for 
determination of post-trial issues was barred by the fact 
that she did not submit the evidence at time of trial. 
c. Should the court change its decision relating to 
application of Michelle's Social Security benefits to Mr. 
Brooks1 obligation to pay private school expenses, then 
Mr. Brooks requested the court receive and evaluate 
additional evidence and make a finding relating to his 
financial inability to pay private school expenses 
without such credit and vacate its order requiring him to 
do so. 
30. The plaintiff made motions to strike the supplement and 
answer filed by Mr. Brooks (R. 759 and R. 788) which the court 
granted. (R. 798) 
31. The court entered its Minute Entry dated December 19, 1991 
wherein it granted Mrs. Nunley's motion for post-trial determina-
tion of modification issues without any evidentiary hearing. (R. 
796) In so doing, the court vacated its Order of April 26, 1991 
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allowing the defendant a credit for amounts paid to Michelle as a 
result of his disability. The court ordered that judgment be 
entered against the defendant in the amount of $13,360.75 for 
private school costs and expenses and in the amount of $805.23 for 
medical and dental expenses. (R. 798) 
32. On or about December 31, 1991 Mr. Brooks filed his Motion 
for Ruling on Omitted Issues, Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and 
Argument of Court's Minute Entry, Motion for a New Trial and Other 
Related Matters. This motion was based in large part upon the 
court's consideration of evidence not submitted at trial without 
allowing a hearing wherein Mr. Brooks would be allowed to cross-
examine Mrs. Nunley on the evidence presented and make objections 
thereto. Mr. Brooks also pointed out that the court failed to rule 
on his request to reconsider its order requiring him to pay one-
half of private school tuition and expenses in the event the court 
reversed its ruling allowing Mr. Brooks credit for Social Security 
benefits received by Michelle towards those expenses. Finally, Mr. 
Brooks argued that the plethora of documents attached to Mrs. 
Nunley's affidavits were hearsay and therefore inadmissible. (R. 
800-812) 
33. Mr. Brooks also filed a Motion to Amend Judgment, and in 
the Alternative, for Relief from Judgment or Order on or about 
January 10, 1992, as well as an objection to the plaintiff's 
proposed order on the motion for post-trial determination (R. 828) 
and a motion for oral argument. Mrs. Nunley objected to all of the 
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foregoing, and in its Minute Entry: dated January 21, 1992, the 
court denied all motions without hearing. (R. 850-852) 
34. Thereafter, each party prepared proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, and each 
objected to the otherfs proposed documents. (R. 878) The court 
heard the argument of the parties relating to the objections on 
March 9, 1992. (A copy of this transcript is found in the same 
bound volume as the trial transcript.) The court again heard 
argument relating to whether or not the court should make a finding 
relating to Mr. Brooks1 ability to pay private school expenses and 
whether or not he should have been allowed cross-examination on the 
documents submitted by Mrs. Nunley relating to those expenses (See 
transcript of March 9th hearing, p. 21.) The parties agreed to sit 
down and discuss an accounting of amounts due under the court's 
ruling, and the court agreed to consider whether or not Mr. Brooks 
was financially able to pay such expenses. (Tr. of March 9th 
hearing pp. 46-47 and see Court's Minute Entry at R. 911) 
35. Mr. Brooks submitted his response to Mrs. Nunleyfs 
accounting on May 15, 1992 wherein Mr. Brooks stipulated that 
certain amounts would be due under the court's ruling. The parties 
agreed that the amounts assessable against the defendant for 
private school expenses totaled $10,158.62, and that Mrs. Nunley 
owed to the defendant the amount of $1,813.25 for one-half of the 
travel costs incurred by him. Therefore, Mr. Brooks owed to the 
plaintiff the amount of $8,345.37. (R. 925) In addition to these 
accounting issues, Mr. Brooks argued in this responsive motion that 
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his share of private school tuition and expenses for the next 
school year would total $3,308.73, and that he was unable to afford 
payment of $300 per month as child support, payment of arrearages 
in the amount of over $8,000, as well as his share of expenses for 
the year 1992-1993 in excess of $3,000. (R. 926) Finally, Mr. 
Brooks set forth the remaining items claimed by Mrs. Nunley to 
which he objected on the basis that they were either incurred prior 
to the filing of the amended petition and therefore inappropriate 
or were items which should be covered from his monthly child 
support. (R. 927) 
36. Mrs. Nunley filed her response and objection on May 20, 
1992 which included a claim for amounts paid for Michelle's 
extracurricular activities in addition to private school expenses 
and costs. (R. 989-1028) 
37. In the court's Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992 the court 
found that Mr. Brooks owed to Mrs. Nunley the sum of $8,312.75 for 
private school tuition and costs; the sum of $578.62 as his share 
of medical, dental and prescription expenses; and the sum of 
$2,900.69 as additional charges for uniforms, activities and 
supplies. (R. 1040) 
38. Over the objection of the defendant, the court entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce on October 2, 1992. (A copy of each is attached to this 
brief as Exhibit A and they are, by reference, made a part hereof) 
The Order granted Mrs. Nunley judgment in the amount of $11,792.06, 
and it denied Mr. Brooks credit for the Social Security benefits 
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received by Michelle. (R. 1051-1075) Mr. Brooks filed his Notice 
of Appeal on Monday, November 2, 1992. (R. 1099) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. It was an abuse of discretion for the court to modify the 
Decree of Divorce between these parties to require Mr. Brooks to 
pay a portion of the minor child's private school expenses without 
finding that there had been a material and substantial change of 
circumstances warranting such modification. Instead, the evidence 
is clear that there was no change of circumstances sufficient to 
warrant the modification, and this court should vacate the lower 
court's order. 
2. Based upon the overwhelming evidence submitted in this 
case and based upon the court's finding that Mr. Brooks had a 
monthly income of $3,029.00, it was an abuse of discretion for the 
court to find that Mr. Brooks had a financial ability to pay 
$300.00 per month in child support, over $3000.00 per year in 
private school expenses, and amounts to satisfy a judgment for 
arrearages for private school, medical and dental expenses in 
excess of $11,000.00. 
3. The court erred as a matter of law in holding that it did 
not have the legal authority to apply Social Security benefits 
received by the minor child as a result of Mr. Brooks' disability 
to his obligation to pay a portion of her private school expenses. 
Instead, the court is empowered to do so by statute and pursuant to 
case law. This court should enter its order allowing Mr. Brooks a 
credit towards his obligation for amounts received by Michelle 
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should it determine that the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering him to pay a portion of her private school 
expenses. 
4. It was an abuse of discretion for the court to consider 
documentary evidence submitted by Mrs. Nunley over six months after 
trial to establish amounts incurred by her from the date of the 
filing of her petition to modify to the time of trial for the minor 
child's medical, dental and private school expenses without 
allowing Mr. Brooks the opportunity for a hearing to cross-examine 
Mrs. Nunley on this evidence and make objections thereto. This 
court should remand this case for a hearing on the evidence should 
it hold that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering Mr. Brooks to pay a portion of Michelle's private school 
expenses. 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR 
THE COURT TO MODIFY THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE TO REQUIRE MR. BROOKS TO PAY 
ONE-HALF OF THE MINOR CHILD'S PRI-
VATE SCHOOL EXPENSES, AND TO ENTER 
JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM FOR ONE-HALF OF 
SUCH EXPENSES PREVIOUSLY INCURRED 
In order to prevail on a petition to modify a decree of 
divorce, the party seeking the relief must establish that, as a 
threshold requirement, there has been a material and substantial 
change in circumstances occurring since entry of the decree of 
divorce. (See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1992) Woodward v. 
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Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985); Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 
330 (Utah 1985); and Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1985).) 
The provisions of the original Decree of Divorce between these 
parties which Mrs. Nunley sought to modify related to responsibili-
ty for payment of the transportation costs of visitation, the 
amount of Mr. Brooks1 child support obligation, responsibility for 
ongoing payment of and reimbursement for medical and dental 
expenses incurred on behalf of the minor child not covered by 
insurance, and responsibility for ongoing payment of and reimburse-
ment for one-half of all costs and expenses associated with the 
minor child's private school and extra-curricular activities. 
While the court expressly found that there had been a material 
and substantial change of circumstances relating to modification 
of the Decree relating to payment of the child's transportation 
costs, the court also expressly found there had been no substantial 
and material change of circumstances in the financial condition of 
the parties to justify an increase in Mr. Brooks' child support 
obligation. (See Finding of Fact No. 16 at R. 1058-59 and Finding 
of Fact No. 10 at R. 1056-57) The court made no specific finding 
whatsoever with respect to whether or not there was a change of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification requiring Mr. 
Brooks to pay one-half of Michelle's private school expenses. 
To begin with, this failure to make such a finding constitutes 
reversible error "unless the facts in the record are 'clear, 
uncontroverted and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of 
the judgment.'" Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 at 425 (Utah App. 
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1990) In this case, the facts are capable of supporting only a 
finding contrary to the court's ruling, Michelle attended private 
school for at least two years prior to entry of the original Decree 
of Divorce, and began private school in Utah within weeks thereaf-
ter. Therefore, there was no substantial change in Michelle's 
circumstances. Secondly, the court did find that there was no 
material or substantial change in the income of the parties to 
warrant an increase in Mr. Brook's child support obligation. It 
would clearly follow that there was no change in the financial 
circumstances of the parties sufficient to warrant a modification 
requiring him to pay the private school expenses. 
As a result, the record is clear that Mrs. Nunley simply could 
not satisfy the threshold requirement necessary for the court to 
grant her the relief requested. This court should make such a 
finding and vacate the lower court's order requiring Mr. Brooks to 
pay a portion of Michelle's private school expenses. In the 
alternative, this court should vacate the order and remand the case 
for specific findings relating to whether or not there has been a 
substantial and material change of circumstances sufficient to 
warrant the modification at issue. 
Even if there had been a sufficient change of circumstances 
warranting an order requiring Mr. Brooks to pay private school 
expenses, the court's finding that he had the financial ability to 
do so is contrary to the evidence and an abuse of discretion. (See 
Finding No. 30 at R. 1063) It is clear under the law that a court 
must consider a parent's financial ability to pay child support and 
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amounts in excess of a basic child support obligation prior to 
making such orders. Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Civil Liability 
for Support Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1, et seq., an obligor 
parent's child support obligation is based on the parties' gross 
monthly income from all but a few enumerated sources. The 
guidelines are, of course, rebuttable, but in order to avoid their 
application, a court must make specific findings which relate to 
the obligor parent's financial circumstances. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3): 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the 
guidelines, the court shall establish support after 
considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee 
for the support of others. 
In addition, although there is no case law on point in the 
State of Utah, other states which have analyzed whether or not an 
obligor parent must pay a portion of private school expenses in 
addition to a base child support amount, have uniformly held that 
one major factor for the court to consider is the ability of the 
obligor parent to pay such expenses. For example, in the case of 
Hardisty v. Hardisty, 439 A.2d 307 (Conn. 1981), the Supreme Court 
of Connecticut was faced with this issue in a modification 
proceeding. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that: 
'[C]ourts have the power to direct one or both 
parents to pay for private schooling, if the 
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circumstances warrant. It is a matter to be 
determined in the sound discretion of the 
court on consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances including the financial ability 
of the parties, the availability of public 
schools, the schools attended by the children 
prior to the divorce, and the special needs 
and general welfare of the children.f 
Id. at 312. (Citing Cleveland v. Cleveland, 161 Conn. 452, 461, 
289 A.2d 909 (1971).) (A copy of the Hardisty case is attached to 
this brief as Exhibit B) 
Given the wide discretion vested in trial courts in the State 
of Utah in fashioning equitable orders in domestic disputes, it 
would follow that Utah would also adopt a standard wherein the 
trial court is required to look at all relevant facts and circum-
stances in determining whether a parent should be compelled to pay 
for a portion of a child's private school expenses. 
Applying the Hardisty factors to the facts of this case, there 
was absolutely no evidence before the court as to the availability 
and quality of public schools and any special needs or requirements 
by Michelle to attend private school. However, as is clear from 
the record, Mr. Brooks is simply financially unable to do so. 
The court appropriately found that Mr. Brooks had a gross 
monthly income of $3,029.00 from his pension and social security 
benefits. Mrs. Nunley argued that Mr. Brooks had the ability to 
earn more and that his purchase of a Ferrari in 1986, his purchase 
of a home in Montana, and the large deposits to his checking 
account established he did so. However, the record clearly 
supports the court's finding. The purchase of the car had been 
five years prior to trial in this matter, and Mr. Brooks accounted 
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for all of the deposits to his account as outlined in his Exhibit 
11. The deposits consisted primarily of proceeds from the sale of 
Mr. Brooks' home in Los angeles, loans and his Social Security and 
pension payments. 
Despite Mrs. Nunley's allegations to the contrary, the 
testimony was essentially uncontroverted that Mr. Brooks suffered 
from thyroid, ulcer and heart diseases and that he had a heart 
attack in January of 1991. He testified that, at the time of 
trial, there was a medical restriction on his becoming actively 
employed. Mr. Brooks further testified that he was suffering from 
post-traumatic stress syndrome, resulting at least in part from two 
helicopter crashes from which he suffered both mental and physical 
difficulties. At the time of trial, he was on numerous medications 
including nitroglycerin, Cortisone, Sinequan, Zanex, Halicion and 
Codeine and Fiorinal. Therefore, he was unable to find private 
employment to earn in excess of the amounts he received from his 
pension and in disability benefits although he had earned extra 
income in the past. 
Finally, despite the fact that the parties have joint physical 
custody of Michelle, Mrs. Nunley's decision to enroll her in 
private school was a unilateral one. At no time did Mrs. Nunley 
discuss the issue with Mr. Brooks, and he was allowed no input 
prior to the decision being made for Michelle. (Trial tr. pp. 42-
43) This is contrary to a joint custody arrangement where parents 
are obliged to exchange information and confer regarding the 
health, education and welfare of their children. (See Utah Code 
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Ann. § 30-3-10.3(2) (b) (Supp. 1992).) Further, at no time did Mrs. 
Nunley request or make demand that Mr. Brooks pay for a portion of 
Michelle's private school expenses until she filed her Amended 
Petition for Modification in November, 1988, three years after her 
decision to enroll Michelle in private school. 
Based on all of the foregoing and the court's finding that Mr. 
Brooks' gross monthly income totalled $3,029.00 per month, it was 
an abuse of discretion to find that Mr. Brooks had the financial 
ability to pay $300.00 per month in child support, ongoing private 
school expenses of over $3,000.00 per year, and arrearages 
totalling $11,792.06. This court should modify the finding, vacate 
the court's order requiring Mr. Brooks to pay private school 
expenses, and vacate the judgment for arrearages entered against 
him. Instead, this court should enter its order denying Mrs. 
Nunley!s claim that Mr. Brooks should pay a portion of Michelle's 
private school expenses. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW MR. BROOKS 
CREDIT TOWARD HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY 
ONE-HALF OF MICHELLE'S PRIVATE 
SCHOOL EXPENSES FOR AMOUNTS SHE 
RECEIVES FROM SOCIAL SECURITY AS A 
RESULT OF HIS DISABILITY 
Throughout this action, Mr. Brooks has taken the position that 
he is financially unable to pay for a portion of Michelle's private 
school expenses unless the court allows him to offset those 
expenses with monies received by Mrs. Nunley on Michelle's behalf 
from Social Security as a result of Mr. Brooks' disability. 
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Originally, in his Minute Entry dated April 26, 1991, the court 
allowed just such an offset. Subsequently, the court agreed to 
reconsider this issue, and Mrs. Nunley filed her Motion for Post-
Trial Determination of Divorce Modification issues. (R. 527) 
In so doing, Mrs. Nunley relied on the provisions of 42 
U.S.C.A. § 407(a) which state that payments of this type are not 
transferrable or assignable and are not subject to execution, levy, 
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the 
operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law. Mrs. Nunley further 
relied on a letter written by Francis R. Darr, a Service Represen-
tative for the Social Security Administration (R. 544) which in 
essence described the nature of the benefits being received by 
Michelle and outlined the priority for their use as being: 1) 
shelter; 2) food; 3) medical and personal needs; and 4) the support 
of legally dependent family members. 
Mr. Brooks argued, among other things, that § 407 does not 
apply to bar the credit and that the concerns raised by Ms. Darr 
were inaplicable because Mr. and Mrs. Nunley had earned anywhere 
from $80,000.00 to $94,000.00 per year from 1986 through 1989 and 
all of Michelle's basic needs were completely satisfied. He 
further relied on Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7.5 (1992) which expressly 
gives the court discretion in determining whether to apply such 
benefits to a parent's child support obligation. The court granted 
Mrs. Nunley's motion on the issue, reversed its ruling made on 
April 26th and denied Mr. Brooks credit for the benefits received 
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by Michelle on the basis that the court believed it did not have 
the authority to order the offset. 
However, the court erred as a matter of law in reaching this 
conclusion, and this court can review the lower court's decision 
for correctness without any special deference. (See Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 1991).) To begin with, 42 USCA 
407 is completely inapplicable to situations such as this. 
Instead, § 407 applies to protect a debtor's Social Security 
disability benefits from the distraint action of creditors so that 
the debtor has sufficient income with which to meet his most basic 
needs. This is not the issue here. Further, even where a creditor 
seeks to attach such benefits, courts have held that § 407 is 
inapplicable if the debtor can satisfy his basic needs. As argued 
by Mr. Brooks and as outlined by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the case of United States v. Devalle, 704 F.2d 1513 
(11th Cir. 1983): 
By insulating Social Security benefits from 
assignment or seizure, § 407 attempts to 
ensure that recipients have the resources 
necessary to meet their most basis needs. . . 
Thus, when the assignment has the effect of 
denying the debtor basic resources, Section 
407 is properly invoked. . . . However, when 
the debtor's ability to care for himself or 
herself is not implicated, Section 407 need 
not be applied. 
Id. at 1516-17. (citations omitted, emphasis added) 
Recognition of the inapplicability of § 407 is reflected in 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(8)(b) (1992). Section 7 8-45-7.5 relates 
to determination of gross income for purposes of computing child 
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support pursuant to the child support guidelines. Subsection 
(8)(b) states as follows: 
Social Security benefits received by a child 
due to the earnings of a parent may be credit-
ed as child support to the parent upon whose 
earning record it is based, by crediting the 
amount against the potential obligation of 
that parent. Other unearned income of a child 
may be considered as income to a parent de-
pending upon the circumstances of each case. 
Clearly, given the inapplicability of § 407 and the clear and 
unambiguous language of this statute, it was error as a matter of 
law for the court to conclude that it simply did not have the 
authority to credit Mr. Brooks with the Social Security disability 
benefits received by Michelle. 
This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion reached by 
the courts of an overwhelming majority of the states, even those 
without express statutory authority upon which to rely. Most 
recently, the issue came before the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 
the case of Pontbriand v. Pontbriand, 622 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1993). (A 
copy of the Pontbriand case is attached to this brief as Exhibit C) 
In holding that an obligor parentfs child support obligation may be 
offset by Social Security benefits paid to dependent children on 
behalf of that parent, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated: 
The rationale for allowing a credit is 
perhaps best stated by a recent Indiana 
decision on the issue. 'The rationale is that 
the social security benefits are not 
gratuities but are earned, and they substitute 
for lost earning power because of the 
disability.' 
Id. at 485. (citing Poynter v. Poynter, 590 N.E.2d 150 at 152 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992).) 
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court went on to emphasize that 
equity and fairness require such a result because the benefits paid 
to the children are funds earned by the obligor parent. Quoting 
the Supreme Court of Vermont, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
stated: 
'Equity and fairness demand that consideration 
be given to government child support benefits 
paid to the party having custody. These 
payments are, in a sense, a substitute for 
wages the obligor would have received but for 
the disability, and from which the court 
ordered payments would otherwise have been 
made. In theory, at least, the actual source 
of payments is of no concern to the party 
having custody as long as they are in fact 
made.' 
Id. at 485. (quoting Davis v. Davis, 141 Vt. 398 at 401, 449 A.2d 
947 at 948 (1982).) (emphasis in original) 
Finally, not only should such payments be applied to a support 
obligation, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that to require an 
obligor parent to seek a formal modification of a decree to claim 
such a credit is overly harsh and that the credit should instead be 
automatic after notification by the obligor parent that the support 
would be met through a different source. 
A similar theory was relied on by the Supreme Court of Kansas 
in the case of Andler v. Andler, 217 Kan. 539, 538 P.2d 649 (1975). 
In reversing a lower court's decision refusing to allow such 
credit, the Kansas Supreme Court stated: 
Social Security benefits paid to the appellee 
for the benefit of the parties1 minor children 
as the result of the appellant's disability 
may not, however, be regarded as gratuitous. 
On the contrary, the payments received by the 
appellee are for the children as beneficiaries 
31 
of an insurance policy. The premiums for such 
policy were paid by the appellant for the 
childrenfs benefit. The purpose of Social 
Security is the same as that of an insurance 
policy with a private carrier, wherein a 
father insures against his possible future 
disability and loss of gainful employment by 
providing for the fulfillment of his moral and 
legal obligations to his children. This 
tragedy having occurred, the insurer has paid 
out benefits to the beneficiaries under its 
contract of insurance with the appellant, and 
the purpose has been accomplished. 
538 P.2d at 653. 
Many other courts agree, and Mr. Brooks would refer this court 
to the following cases: Windham v. Alabama, 574 So.2d 853, 17 FLR 
1130 (Ala Ct. Civ. App. 1990); Cash v. Cash, 353 SW.2d 348 (Ark. 
Sup. Ct. 1962); Lopez v. Lopez, 609 P.2d 579 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); 
In re Denny, 171 Cal. Rptr. 440, 7 FLR 2314 (Ct. of App. 1981); 
Perteet v. Sumner, 269 SE.2d 453 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1980); Newman v. 
Newman, 451 NW.2d 843, 16 FLR 1197 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1990); 
Childerson v. Hess, 555 N.E.2d 1070 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Poynter 
v. Poynter, 590 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); McCloud v. 
McCloud, 544 So.2d 764 (La. Ct. App. 1989); 
Frens v. Frens, 478 N.W.2d 750, 18 FLR 1206 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); 
Mooneyham v. Mooneyham, 420 So.2d 1072, 9 FLR 2124 (Miss. Supt. Ct. 
1982); Weaks v. Weaks, 821 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1991); Hanthorn 
v. Hanthorn. 460 N.W.2d 650 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1990); Griffin v. Avery, 
424 A.2d 175, 7 FLR 2226 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1980); Romero v. Romero, 
682 P.2d 201 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Guthmiller v. Guthmiller, 448 
N.W.2d 643, 16 FLR 1064 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1989); Davis v. Davis, 449 
A.2d 947 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1982) 
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Allowing a parent credit for disability benefits received by 
a minor child is the more reasoned approach, and coupled with Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(8)(b) clearly establishes that the lower 
court in this case erred, as a matter of law, in basing its order 
on a belief that the court did not have authority to grant a credit 
to Mr. Brooks for the disability benefits received by Michelle. In 
fact, in this case, this conclusion is even more compelling. Mr. 
Brooks is not attempting to offset his basic child support 
obligation in any way, and in fact stipulated to continue paying 
$300 per month despite the fact that pursuant to the Child Support 
Guidelines, his obligation would only be $252 per month. He simply 
seeks credit toward payment of an expense which for many people is 
a luxury item. Further, it was clear from the evidence before the 
court that there is no issue as to whether Michelle's basic food 
and shelter needs are being met. Mr. and Mrs. Nunley earned 
anywhere from $80,000 to $94,000 per year from 1986 through 1989. 
As a result, if this court finds it was not an abuse of 
discretion to order Mr. Brooks to pay a portion of Michellefs 
private school expenses, then this court should vacate that portion 
of the Order modifying the Decree of Divorce that denies Mr. Brooks 
the credit at issue and enter its own order allowing him to offset 
his obligation with the Social Security benefits received by 
Michelle as a result of his disability. 
Ill 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING MRS. NUNLEY TO SUBMIT 
EVIDENCE AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF 
TRIAL TO ESTABLISH AMOUNTS CLAIMED 
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Two of the primary issues at trial in this case were Mrs. 
Nunley's claim that Mr. Brooks should be ordered to pay one-half of 
Michellefs private school expenses and one-half of her medical and 
dental expenses not covered by insurance and that she be awarded 
judgment against Mr. Brooks for amounts which had accrued prior to 
trial. Even so, there was absolutely no documentary evidence 
submitted by Mrs. Nunley at the time of trial which would establish 
amounts she had paid for which she was seeking reimbursement. In 
fact, the only evidence at trial presented by Mrs. Nunley with 
respect to Michelle's private school expenses is found at 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. This exhibit listed Michelle's total 
private school expenses per year to be $7,350.00, including extra 
curricular activities of $1,775.00. The only evidence relating to 
medical and dental expenses incurred was testimony elicited from 
Mrs. Nunley on cross- examination. She testified that she was 
seeking one-half of a $200.00 deductible and one-half of 
approximately $200.00 in medical bills. While she did not remember 
off-hand, she believed that Michelle's orthodontial work was in 
excess of $3000.00 or $4000.00. (See Trial transcript p. 58.) 
It was not until November 1, 1991, over six month's after 
trial, that Mrs. Nunley submitted over one hundred and fifty pages 
of documents purporting to establish her claim that judgment should 
be entered against Mr. Brooks in the amount of $13,360.75 for 
private school expenses and in the amount of $805.23 for medical 
and dental expenses. Despite Mr. Brooks' repeated requests, the 
court refused to conduct a hearing wherein he would have an 
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opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. Nunley on the documents presented 
and make objections thereto. 
The court's refusal was an abuse of discretion. Rule 43 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the taking of evidence in 
trials and on motions. In all trials, the courts are required to 
take testimony of witnesses orally and in open court pursuant to 
Rule 43(a). Rule 43(b) addresses the issue of when a matter should 
be heard which is presented by motion. It states as follows: 
(b) Evidence on Motions. When a motion is 
based on facts not appearing of record the 
court may hear the matter on affidavits 
presented by the respective parties, but the 
court may direct that the matter be heard 
wholly or partly on oral testimony or 
depositions. 
While this provision grants to a lower court the discretion to 
determine whether or not to conduct a hearing and take oral 
testimony, the Utah Supreme Court has held that when disputed 
material facts are alleged in opposition to a motion, there should 
be an evidentiary hearing to resolve those issues. Specifically, 
in Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142 (Utah 
1977), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We recognize that Rule 43(e) allows the 
District Court to grant or deny a motion on 
the sole or combined bases of affidavits, 
depositions or oral testimony. However, when 
no depositions have been taken and disputed 
material facts are alleged in opposing 
affidavits, there should be an evidentiary 
hearing to aid in the resolution of those 
facts. The reasons for requiring an 
evidentiary hearing under the circumstances 
were enunciated in Autera v. Robinson, 136 
U.S. App.D.C. 216, 419 F.2nd 1197, 1202 
(1969) , as follows: 
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'Had no factual dispute arisen to plague the 
parties1 substantive rights, we would perceive 
no difficulty in the judgefs acceptance as a 
predicate for his action, of the facts 
represented through statements by members of 
the bar and affidavits of the parties or 
others. In this case, however, despite the 
factual questions developing as the hearing 
moved along, no opportunity was afforded 
anyone to test any representation by the 
chastening process of cross-examination . . . 
The opportunity to judge credibility was 
non-existent as to the absent affiants; the 
opportunity to probe by cross-examination was 
completely lacking. Without these twin tools, 
normal in the trial of factual issues, the 
factual conclusion was certain to take on an 
unaccustomed quality of artificiality . . . We 
recognize, of course, that trial judges have a 
discretion to hear and determine ordinary 
motions either on affidavits or oral testimony 
portraying facts not appearing of record. We 
note, however, that an attempted resolution of 
factual disputes on conflicting affidavits 
alone may pose the question whether the 
discretion was properly exercised.f 
565 P. 2d at 1143. (Although the Utah Supreme Court cited Rule 
43(e) and not 43(b), the court quoted the provisions of 43(e) in 
footnote no. 2, and it is identical to the current language of Rule 
43(b)) 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that "where a crucial 
conflict arises, as in this case, the matter should be resolved by 
depositions or an evidentiary hearing so that the factors for 
testing representations of witnesses as found in Autera, supra, 
[are utilized]" IcL_ at 1144. 
This principle is further embodied in Rule 4-501 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration which allows a party to request a 
hearing "where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice." 
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Pursuant to 4-501(3)(c), the court must grant the request unless 
the motion is frivolous or the issues have already been 
authoritatively decided. 
Applying these principals to the facts of this case, the lower 
court abused its discretion in failing to allow Mr. Brooks an 
evidentiary hearing on expenses claimed by Mrs. Nunley and to allow 
the opportunity for cross-examination. To begin with, none of the 
documents produced in her Motion for Determination for Post-Trial 
Issues was submitted to Mr. Brooks in the course of discovery in 
this case, and none of it was presented at trial in April of 1991. 
No reason was offered for Mrs. Nunley's failure to timely present 
the evidence, and it was not submitted to the court or Mr. Brooks 
until six months after trial. 
In a written memoranda, Mr. Brooks set forth numerous 
objections to the timeliness of the submission of evidence and 
argued it should be barred by Mrs. Nunley's failure to submit it at 
trial. Mr. Brooks also raised objections to the documents 
themselves. These included the following: 1) some of the 
documents had absolutely no reference to the date the expense was 
purportedly incurred by Mrs. Nunley; 2) certain of the documents 
which did have dates placed those expenses at a time prior to Mrs. 
Nunley's filing of her Amended Petition to Modify despite the 
court1 s order that she was entitled to reimbursement only from that 
day forward; 3) certain of the documents were illegible; and (4) 
there was no evidence with respect to whether or not medical and 
dental expenses had been submitted to an insurance carrier and what 
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portion, if any, had been paid the carrier. (R. 777 through 786) 
These objections and defenses raise what the Utah Supreme Court 
defined as a "crucial conflict" in the Stan Katz Real Estate case, 
supra, and the issues should have been resolved by an evidentiary 
hearing so that the representations could be submitted to the 
"chastening process of cross-examination" and the opportunity to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Mrs. Nunley will argue that the document in which these 
defenses were raised was not timely filed by Mr. Brooks and was 
therefore appropriately stricken by the court. However, the 
court's granting Mrs. Nunley's motion to strike this memorandum was 
an abuse of discretion and contrary to the law of this case. 
Previously, the court allowed Mrs. Nunley an opportunity to submit 
documentary evidence on primary issues of this case despite the 
fact that she failed to do so at time of trial. In addition, at 
the August 9, 1991 hearing when the court agreed to allow Mrs. 
Nunley an opportunity to submit her motion to amend pursuant to 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the court 
anticipated that the motion would be filed prior to the end of the 
month. Counsel for Mr. Brooks was expressly given 30 days within 
which to respond to Mrs. Nunleyfs motion, with the caveat that his 
response would be due no sooner than September 6, 1991. Even so, 
Mrs. Nunleyfs motion was not filed until November 1, 1991. 
Although the motion was not timely made, the court denied Mr. 
Brooks' motion to strike it on that basis. (R. 376-379 and R. 732) 
Given the seriousness of the issues and given the court's 
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willingness to allow Mrs. Nunley to submit evidence and motions in 
an untimely fashion, it was an abuse of discretion to strike a 
response by Mr. Brooks raising legitimate objections and defenses. 
Based upon the foregoing, if this court does not alter Mr. 
Brooks1 obligation to pay private school expenses, then this court 
should vacate the judgment against Mr. Brooks for past due medical 
and dental expenses and private school expenses and remand the 
issue of arrearages for a full evidentiary hearing before the trial 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
It was an abuse of discretion for the lower court to modify 
the Decree of Divorce in this case to require Mr. Brooks to pay a 
portion of Michellefs private school expenses. The evidence in the 
record is clear and there can be only two conclusions: 1) there 
was no substantial change of circumstances entitling Mrs. Nunley to 
this modification; and 2) Mr. Brooks does not have the financial 
ability to pay such expenses. This court should simply vacate the 
order in this regard and enter its own order denying Mrs. Nunley's 
claim. In the alternative, should this court uphold the order 
requiring Mr. Brooks to pay a portion of Michelle's private school 
expenses, it should enter its own order granting Mr. Brooks credit 
towards his obligation for Social Security benefits received by 
Michelle as a result of his disability. Finally, if Mr. Brooks is 
to be responsible for arrearages in medical, dental and private 
school expenses, then he is entitled to a hearing to determine the 
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amount of those arrearages and his financial ability to satisfy the 
obligation, and these issues should be remanded accordingly. 
Dated this day of June, 1993. 
LIAPIS, GRAY, STEGALL & GREEN 
Kim M. 
Attorneys for Defendant, Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY), ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
THOMAS M. BROOKS, ] 
Defendant. 
) Case No. C 88 4192 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs "Amended Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce" and Defendant's 
"Countermotion" came on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of April, 1991 before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat. Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through her 
attorney of record, Randall J. Holmgren. Defendant appeared in person and by and 
through his attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis. The Court heard the sworn testimony of 
Plaintiff and Defendant, marked and received documents and exhibits in support of the 
positions of Plaintiff and Defendant, heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the records and 
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files herein and, took the matter under advisement and thereafter issued its Minute Entry 
on the 26th day of April, 1991. 
Following the issuance of said Minute Entry, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Clarification of Ruling and Defendant filed a Countermotion for Attorney Fees. Defendant 
submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court on or about June 
3, 1991, and Plaintiff objected to those proposed Findings and Conclusions and submitted 
her own proposed Findings of Fact (with footnotes indicating the portions of the Court's 
April 26, 1991 Minute Entry and Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact needing 
clarification). The Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification and the Defendant's Countermotion 
for Attorney Fees were heard on August 7, 1991. 
The Court entered an Order (Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Ruling and 
Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney Fees) on December 3, 1991. In said Order, 
portions of the April 26, 1991 Minute Entry were clarified and other portions were reserved 
for further review. In particular, said Order directed Plaintiff to submit a motion and 
supporting memorandum to the Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, addressing the issues that the Court reserved for further review. The Court 
directed that entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Divorce Modification 
Order be delayed until such time as such post-trial motion was submitted and ruled on so 
that the issues thereby resolved, together with the issues clarified by the December 3, 1991 
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Order, could be included in the final Findings, Conclusions, and modification of decree 
Order pertaining to the April 22, 1991. 
On or about November 1, 1991, Plaintiff submitted her "Motion for Post-Trial 
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues," as directed by the Court. The Motion was 
opposed by Defendant. The matter was submitted to the Court in accordance with Rule 4-
501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Court issued a Minute Entry ruling 
dated December 19, 1991 and entered an "Order (Re: Motion for Post-Trial Determination 
of Divorce Modification Issues)" on January 10, 1992. 
On or about March 6, 1992, upon the request of the Defendant, the Court instructed 
Plaintiff and Defendant to submit an accounting to the Court with respect to the amounts 
expended by Plaintiff on behalf of the parties' minor child, Michelle, for private school, 
tuition, books, uniforms, school supplies and school activities, and medical, dental and 
prescription expenses. Accordingly, on or about May 15, 1992, Defendant submitted 
"Defendant's Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request." On or about May 19, 
1992, Plaintiff submitted "Plaintiffs Response and Objection to 'Defendant's Response to 
Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request'." Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration, the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated July 22, 1992. 
The Court having duly considered the foregoing, incorporates herein its trial ruling 
(i.e., 4/26/91 Minute Entry), its post-trial Orders dated December 3, 1991 and January 10, 
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1992, and its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, and the Court does now make, adopt and 
find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on the 14th day of August, 1985 in the 
State of California pursuant to a written divorce settlement agreement. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded joint legal and physical custody of the 
minor child, Michelle Nohealani Brooks, now age 11, born September 18, 1980. Plaintiff 
was awarded the primary physical custody of said child and Defendant was awarded 
specified custodial rights with said child, and Plaintiff, JO ANN NUNLEY (BROOKS), was 
ordered to bear the expense of the transportation of the minor child to and from Los 
Angeles, California to visit the Defendant, THOMAS M. BROOKS, during his on-schedule 
custodial period. 
3. The Decree of Divorce required the Defendant to pay to Plaintiff child 
support in the sum of $300.00 per month on the 1st day of each month commencing on the 
1st day of August, 1985, and continuing until the said child reaches the age of eighteen (18), 
joins the armed forces, is fully employed, is married, is emancipated or upon her death. 
Plaintiff was further ordered to pay to Defendant $100.00 per month as child support if the 
minor child resided with the Defendant for sixteen (16) days or more in any month. 
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4. The Court finds that at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
Plaintiff was employed with TWA Airlines, with a gross year-end income of $28,687.24, or 
a gross monthly amount of $2,390.60. The Court finds that the Defendant was receiving 
disability income at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and, pursuant to the 
Settlement Agreement of the parties, had a net income of $1,600.00 per month. 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant, THOMAS M. BROOKS, has a current 
gross income of $3,029.26 per month. The Court bases this finding on all of the evidence 
submitted at trial, including the evidence that his disability and social security income is tax-
free, and including his income producing capabilities, and the Court believes that the finding 
is based on due consideration of all of the evidence. 
6. The Court finds that the income of the Plaintiff is approximately $10,000.00 
per year (or about $833.00 per month), based upon the stipulated testimony of the Plaintiff 
at trial, and the Court finds that her imputed income should be approximately $833.00 per 
month. The Court did not find evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff was earning more 
than her stipulated income of $10,000.00 per year. 
7. The Court finds that there has not been a substantial and material change of 
circumstances based upon its finding that Plaintiff has a minimum of $833.00 gross per 
month from her costume business, and further that she earned a profit of approximately 
$4,493.00 for the tax year 1990 from her costume business, that she had incorporated into 
her tax return a rental write-off of $5,400.00 while operating this business out of her home, 
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and that the Plaintiff had the ability to write-off substantial amounts of expenses through 
her business, without being required to take money from the business in a taxable form. 
The Court notes that the Defendant claims a $400.00 per month expenditure to maintain 
his Ferrari automobile and that the total of Defendant's checking account deposits for the 
period May 16,1988 through July 17,1990, shows approximately $173,000.00 of deposits and 
$171,000.00 of withdrawals. While there are fcertain explanations made which could explain 
some of the discrepancy, it certainly did not describe or explain away all of the discrepancy 
as to the Defendant's expenditures. 
8. The Court further finds that the Defendant stated that he was willing to pay 
child support at the rate of $300.00 per month for his share of the minor child's daily needs, 
and acknowledged that said amount was higher than the sum calculated under the Uniform 
Child Support Worksheet. 
9. The Court is of the opinion that the exhibits and testimony produced by both 
parties at the time of the trial do not fully reveal the nature and extent of their respective 
incomes and, therefore, the Court cannot draw any more specific findings from the evidence 
presented at the time of the trial as to either party's income. 
10. The Court finds from the evidence presented and its additional findings set 
forth above, that Plaintiff and Defendant clearly have additional income which the Court 
has not been able to compute and arrive at a figure for each party. The Court's best 
judgment is that it is at a level which does not justify a finding of a substantial change of 
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material circumstances and, therefore, the child support sum of $300.00 per month should 
be left in place, particularly in view of the Defendant's willingness to keep the child support 
at its current level of $300.00 per month. 
11. For all of the above-said reasons, the Court found that the Plaintiff had failed 
to prove a material and substantial change of circumstances to justify the increase in child 
support sought by the Plaintiff in this matter. 
12. The Court finds, as to the visitation transportation expenses, that the reason 
and basis upon which the original transportation order in this matter was entered (i.e., the 
California Divorce Decree) was that Plaintiff was then employed by TWA airlines and could 
thus provide free transportation, or at least it was contemplated that Plaintiff could provide 
free transportation, for the minor child from Salt Lake City to Defendant's home in Los 
Angeles. The Court further finds that Plaintiff is no longer employed by TWA and cannot 
provide free transportation for the minor child. 
13. The Court notes that Plaintiffs husband (an airline employee) has access to 
passes and/or discount fares for his family. The Court finds that it is willing to find that 
Plaintiff should ask her husband to secure discount tickets for travel of the minor child to 
and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiffs husband is willing to do so, Plaintiff should 
then send a photocopy of the front page of the itinerary part of the ticket indicating the 
amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse Plaintiff for his one-half of that amount one 
(1) week prior to the flight. The Court finds that if Defendant does not reimburse Plaintiff 
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for his one-half, then no visitation should occur. The Court finds that such visitation should 
be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled visitation and all parties 
should cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. The Court also finds that if Plaintiffs 
husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, Plaintiff should 
then buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement under the 
conditions set forth above. The Courts finds that the Plaintiff should cooperate in seeing 
that the Defendant has all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the 
California Decree of Divorce. 
14. The Court finds that in addition to the above loss of Plaintiffs TWA benefits 
that the Defendant has moved from Los Angeles, California to Montana and the Court 
finds, in a technical sense, that Plaintiffs responsibility for payment of transportation for the 
minor child's visit would terminate upon that condition. 
15. Without relying on the technical statement above, the Court is of the opinion 
that clearly the parties contemplated the furnishing of that transportation through Plaintiff 
employment as a perk, at no cost to the Plaintiff, and on that basis, she was willing to 
provide the benefit to the parties. 
16. The Court finds that all of the above constitute a sufficient, substantial and 
material change of circumstances to require each party to share equally the costs of 
transportation for Defendant's visitation until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and 
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graduates from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until 
further order of this Court. 
17. The Court finds that Plaintiff should reimburse Defendant for one-half of the 
transportation costs that Defendant has reasonably incurred in exercising his visitation rights 
with the minor child of the parties. Based upon the Court's review of Plaintiffs and 
Defendant's "Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request", said expenses total 
$2,534.50 for visitation expenses from NoVember 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991. 
Therefore, Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant for one-half of $2,534.50 or 
$1,267.25 and judgment should enter accordingly. 
18. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has enrolled the minor child in a private 
school, Rowland-Hall St. Mark's, and that she has expended substantial sums of money to 
keep said child in a private school. The Court further finds that both Plaintiff and 
Defendant are desirous for their child to be enrolled in private school. The Court finds that 
the Defendant noted that he did not believe that he had the ability to maintain the costs to 
maintain the minor child in private school. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant should pay one-half of the 
private school tuition, books, supplies, school activities, and school uniforms from the date 
of Plaintiffs Amended Petition, November 21, 1988, when this issue was first raised by 
Plaintiff, until the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of this Court. 
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20. The Court finds that subsequent to the trial in this matter, Plaintiff presented 
a letter, over the objection of Defendant's counsel, from an employee of the Social Security 
Administration, dated July 12, 1991, indicating that the Court could not assign or determine 
how benefits paid to the minor child could be used. The Court was subsequently requested 
by counsel for Plaintiff to permit the filing of a Motion for Post-Trial Determination of this 
social security issue and the Court found that the matter should be submitted to it under 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Defendant was to respond to that 
Motion within thirty (30) days after filing and no sooner than the 6th of September, 1991. 
21. The Court finds, after review of the matters submitted to it under the "Motion 
for Post-Trial Determination," that contrary to its April 26, 1991 trial Minute Entry, it does 
not have the power to assign the social security auxiliary benefits received by the parties' 
minor child (by reason of Defendant's permanent disability) to meet the Defendant's 
obligation to pay one-half of the child's private-school expenses. The social security 
auxiliary benefits received by the minor child do not reduce the disability benefits otherwise 
due to or received by the Defendant and, in fact, said auxiliary benefits are for the minor 
child's use only and cannot be judicially assigned or designated for any other use. The 
Court finds that the Defendant should meet his obligations for one-half of the minor child's 
private school expenses from his own resources and not from the child's social security 
benefits. 
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22. The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for 
Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response 
to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request," that the parties have agreed that Plaintiff has 
incurred the sum of $19,160.00 for Michelle's private school expenses which include tuition, 
interest, insurance, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from November 
21, 1988 through September 16, 1991. The Court finds that Defendant should pay Plaintiff 
one-half of said amount, or $9,580.00, and judgment should enter accordingly. 
23. The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for 
Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response 
to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request," that Plaintiff has incurred an additional sum of 
$5,801.38 for Michelle's private school expenses which include school activities, supplies and 
school uniforms. The Court finds that Defendant should pay Plaintiff one-half of said 
amount, or $2,900.69, and judgment should enter accordingly. 
24. The Court further finds that the parties should share equally the cost of such 
expenses that are incurred after September 16, 1991 until the child ceases to attend private 
school or until further order of this Court. 
25. The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for 
Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response 
to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request," that the Plaintiff has incurred medical, dental 
and prescription expenses (not covered by insurance) from November 21, 1988 through 
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March 31,1992, for the minor child, Michelle, of $1,157.24. The Court finds that Defendant 
should pay Plaintiff one-half of said amount, or $578.62, and judgment should enter 
accordingly. 
26. The Court finds that the parties should share equally, from March 31, 1992, 
one-half of the insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription 
expenses for the minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has 
graduated from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until 
further order of this Court. 
27. The Court finds that while the extracurricular activities of the minor child as 
shown on Plaintiffs trial Exhibit 5, may be advantageous to the minor child and may be 
desirable, the Court finds that the Defendant should not be obligated to pay one-half of 
those expenses. 
28. The Court finds that it has no intention at this point in ruling that Plaintiff is 
at risk to return Michelle's benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that 
the Defendant is not legally disabled. 
29. The Court finds that the amounts awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant 
by way of judgment (in parag. 22 above) for the minor child's private school tuition, books, 
supplies, school activities and school uniforms is $12,480.69. Defendant's one-half share of 
Michelle's medicals is $578.62. The total of $13,059.31 should be reduced by the judgment 
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entered against Plaintiff for reimbursement of visitation transportation costs of $1,267.25, 
leaving a judgment owing in Plaintiffs favor against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06. 
30. The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income 
level of the Defendant in determining the obligations he is to pay on behalf of the parties' 
minor child. The Court finds that Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed 
herein. 
31. The Court finds that both Plaintiff and Defendant have incurred attorneys' 
fees in this matter. The Court finds that neither of the parties are entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees from the other and that each should bear their own expenses and fees. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and adopts the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs Petition to increase child support for the minor child, should be 
denied. 
2. The prior order of support established by the California Court requiring 
Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $300.00 per month as child support should remain in full force 
and effect. 
3. A substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred with the 
Defendant's move to the State of Montana and the Plaintiffs loss of travel benefits from her 
former employer, TWA Airlines. The prior custodial visitation order that Plaintiff pay all 
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transportation costs should be amended to require each of the parties to share equally, at 
the best available rate, all of the costs of transportation for the child from Utah to 
Defendant's residence until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and graduates from high 
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this 
Court. Plaintiff should be ordered to ask her husband (an airline employee) to secure 
discount tickets for travel of the minor child to and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiffs 
husband is willing to do so, Plaintiff should then send a photocopy of the front page of the 
itinerary part of the ticket indicating the amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse 
Plaintiff for his one-half of that amount one (1) week prior to the flight. If Defendant does 
not reimburse Plaintiff for his one-half, at least one (1) week prior to the flight, then no 
visitation should occur. Such visitation should be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior 
to the scheduled visitation and all parties should cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. 
If Plaintiffs husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, 
Plaintiff should then buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement 
under the conditions set forth above. The parties should cooperate in seeing that the 
Defendant has all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the California 
Decree of Divorce. 
4. Defendant should be awarded judgment against Plaintiff for one-half of those 
amounts incurred by the Defendant for transportation costs to accomplish his visitation from 
November 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991 in the sum of $1,267.25. 
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5. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share 
of the minor child's private school tuition, interest, insurance, books, fees, uniforms and 
school activities in the sum of $9,580.00 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 
1991. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share 
of the minor child's additional private school activities, supplies and school uniforms in the 
sum of $2,900.69 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 1991, 
7. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share 
of the minor child's medical, dental and prescription expenses in the sum of $578.62 from 
November 21, 1988 through March 31, 1992. 
8. The judgment awarded to Defendant above of $1,267.25 is to be applied 
toward the three (3) judgments awarded to Plaintiff, totalling $13,059.31, leaving a new 
amount in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06. 
9. Plaintiff and Defendant should pay one-half of the minor child's private school 
tuition, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from September 16, 1991 until 
the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of this Court. 
10. On the social security issue, the Court hereby amends its prior ruling in its 
Minute Entry of April 26, 1991 and awards all amounts that have been paid to the minor 
child, Michelle, as her benefits under the social security auxiliary benefits received (due to 
Defendant's permanent disability) to the minor child as her proceeds, and the same are not 
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to be credited toward any amount of support for the minor child by Defendant or to cover 
her private school costs. 
11. The parties should share equally, from March 31, 1992, one-half of the 
insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription expenses for the 
minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has graduated from high 
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this 
Court. 
12. The Defendant should not be obligated to pay one-half of the minor child's 
extracurricular activities. 
13. The Court makes no ruling with regard to Plaintiffs risk to return Michelle's 
benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that the Defendant is not legally 
disabled. 
14. The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income 
level of the Defendant in determining Defendant's obligations on behalf of the parties' 
minor child. Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed herein. 
15. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant should be awarded any attorneys' fee or costs 
in this matter, and each should assume and pay their own fees incurred. 
16. All remaining provisions of the California Order not amended, modified or 
altered by this Order should remain in full force and effect. 
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Date: fatfo:^ 199 2 -^r 
BY THE COUR' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, to the following, on 
this *Q_ day of S n ? \ • 19f2. 
Paul H. Liapis 
Liapis, Gray, Stegall & Green 
New York Building, #300 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ak l/u/> 
Laura L. Hoins 
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RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054 
Attorney at Law 
The Valley Tower, Suite 111 1 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 328-4333 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Third Judi'.i.-.! L'.rtCi 
OCT - 2 1992 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH ^ 
JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS M. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. C 88 4192 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiffs "Amended Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce" and Defendant's 
"Countermotion" came on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of April, 1991 before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat. Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through her 
attorney of record, Randall J. Holmgren. Defendant appeared in person and by and 
through his attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis. The Court heard the sworn testimony of 
Plaintiff and Defendant, marked and received documents and exhibits in support of the 
positions of Plaintiff and Defendant, heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the records and 
files herein and, took the matter under advisement and thereafter issued its Minute Entry 
on the 26th day of April, 1991. 
Following the issuance of said Minute Entry, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Clarification of Ruling and Defendant filed a Countermotion for Attorney Fees. Defendant 
submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court on or about June 
3, 1991, and Plaintiff objected to those proposed Findings and Conclusions and submitted 
her own proposed Findings of Fact (with footnotes indicating the portions of the Court's 
April 26, 1991 Minute Entry and Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact needing 
clarification). The Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification and the Defendant's Countermotion 
for Attorney Fees were heard on August 7, 1991. 
The Court entered an Order (Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Ruling and 
Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney Fees) on December 3, 1991. In said Order, 
portions of the April 26, 1991 Minute Entry were clarified and other portions were reserved 
for further review. In particular, said Order directed Plaintiff to submit a motion and 
supporting memorandum to the Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, addressing the issues that the Court reserved for further review. The Court 
directed that entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions ©f Law, and Divorce Modification 
Order be delayed until such time as such post-trial motion was submitted and ruled on so 
that the issues thereby resolved, together with the issues clarified by the December 3, 1991 
? 
Order, could be included in the final Findings, Conclusions, and modification of decree 
Order pertaining to the April 22, 1991. 
On or about November 1, 1991, Plaintiff submitted her "Motion for Post-Trial 
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues," as directed by the Court. The Motion was 
opposed by Defendant. The matter was submitted to the Court in accordance with Rule 4-
501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Court issued a Minute Entry ruling 
dated December 19, 1991 and entered an "Order (Re: Motion for Post-Trial Determination 
of Divorce Modification Issues)" on January 10, 1992. 
On or about March 6, 1992, upon the request of the Defendant, the Court instructed 
Plaintiff and Defendant to submit an accounting to the Court with respect to the amounts 
expended by Plaintiff on behalf of the parties' minor child, Michelle, for private school, 
tuition, books, uniforms, school supplies and school activities, and medical, dental and 
prescription expenses. Accordingly, on or about May 15, 1992, Defendant submitted 
"Defendant's Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request." On or about May 19, 
1992, Plaintiff submitted "Plaintiffs Response and Objection to 'Defendant's Response to 
Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request'." Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration, the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated July 22, 1992. 
The Court having duly considered the foregoing, incorporates herein its trial ruling 
(i.e., 4/26/91 Minute Entry), its post-trial Orders dated December 3, 1991 and January 10, 
3 
1992, and its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, and the Court having entered its written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiffs Petition to increase child support for the minor child is hereby 
denied. 
2. The prior order of support established by the California Court requiring 
Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $300.00 per month as child support will remain in full force 
and effect. 
3. A substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred with the 
Defendant's move to the State of Montana and the Plaintiffs loss of travel benefits from her 
former employer, TWA Airlines. The prior custodial visitation order that Plaintiff pay all 
transportation costs is hereby amended to require each of the parties to share equally, at 
the best available rate, all of the costs of transportation for the child from Utah to 
Defendant's residence until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and graduates from high 
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this 
Court. Plaintiff is ordered to ask her husband (an airline employee) to secure discount 
tickets for travel of the minor child to and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiff s husband 
is willing to do so, Plaintiff shall then send a photocopy of the front page of the itinerary 
part of the ticket indicating the amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse Plaintiff for his 
one-half of that amount one (1) week prior to the flight. If Defendant does not reimburse 
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Plaintiff for his one-half, at least one (1) week prior to the flight, then no visitation will 
occur. Visitation will be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled 
visitation and all parties will cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. If Plaintiffs 
husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, Plaintiff shall then 
buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement under the conditions 
set forth above. The parties are ordered to will cooperate in seeing that the Defendant has 
all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the California Decree of Divorce. 
4. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded judgment against Plaintiff for one-half 
of those amounts incurred by the Defendant for transportation costs to accomplish his 
visitation from November 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991 in the sum of $1,267.25. 
5. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for 
his share of the minor child's private school tuition, interest, insurance, books, fees, uniforms 
and school activities in the sum of $9,580.00 from November 21, 1988 through September 
16, 1991. 
6. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for 
his share of the minor child's additional private school activities, supplies and uniforms in 
the sum of $2,900.69 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 1991. 
7. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for 
his share of the minor child's medical, derttal and prescription expenses in the sum of 
$578.62 from November 21, 1988 through March 31, 1992. 
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8. The judgment awarded to Defendant above of $1,267.25 is to be applied 
toward the three (3) judgments awarded to Plaintiff, totalling $13,059.31, leaving a new 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06. 
9. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered to pay one-half of the minor 
child's private school tuition, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from 
September 16, 1991 until the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of 
this Court. 
10. On the social security issue, the Court orders that the amounts paid to the 
minor child, Michelle, as her benefits under the social security auxiliary benefits received 
(due to Defendant's permanent disability) are the minor child's and the same are not to be 
credited toward any amount of support for the minor child by Defendant or to cover her 
private school costs. 
11. The parties are hereby ordered to share equally, from March 31, 1992, one-
half of the insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription expenses 
for the minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has graduated 
from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order 
of this Court. 
12. The Defendant is not obligated to pay one-half of the minor child's 
extracurricular activities. 
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13. The Court makes no ruling with regard to Plaintiffs risk to return Michelle's 
benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that the Defendant is not legally 
disabled. 
14. The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income 
level of the Defendant in determining Defendant's obligations on behalf of the parties' 
minor child. Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed herein. 
15. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant shall be awarded any attorneys' fee or costs 
in this matter, and each shall assume and pay their own fees incurred. 
16. All remaining provisions of the California Order not amended, modified or 
altered by this Order should remain in full force and effect. 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to the following, on this 3Q 
day of S^pV- 19^-. 
Paul H. Liapis 
Liapis, Gray, Stegall & Green 
New York Building, #300 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Laura L. Hoins 
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EXHIBIT B 
HARDISTY v 
Cite as, Conn., 
connected the defendant to the forcible en-
try and wrongful taking beyond any rea-
sonable doubt. The court did not err in 
denying the defendant's motion for acquit-
tal or to set aside the verdict. 
The defendant claims that the court erred 
in its instructions to the jury on circumstan-
tial evidence and by not charging the jury 
as he requested. The paragraphs of the 
requested charge at issue dealt essentially 
with circumstantial evidence.3 A resolution 
of the charge on circumstantial evidence is 
dispositive of these claimed errors. 
The court charged the jury in part as 
follows: "You may give such weight as you 
may determine to the manner in which 
counsel have put their evidence together 
and apply it to the law. You may draw 
from any facts which have been admitted 
or proved to you such inferences as are 
reasonable and logical. Inferences should 
not be drawn but from logical relation to 
facts which you have found to be proved or 
admitted. You should not base any infer-
ences on things that you might surmise, 
speculate or guess. This is what is called 
circumstantial evidence. Drawing of infer-
ences from facts found, admitted or proved 
to prove a material fact." The judge also 
charged the jury that the presumption of 
innocence "requires if a piece of evidence 
offered is capable of two reasonable con-
structions, one of which favors innocence, it 
must be given the construction favoring 
innocence." 
[5,6] The charge must be considered 
from the standpoint of its effect on the jury 
in guiding them to a proper verdict. State 
v. Rose, 169 Conn. 683, 688-89, 363 A.2d 
1077 (1975); State v. Bell, 153 Conn. 540, 
544, 219 A.2d 218 (1966). After reviewing 
the court's instruction on the law of circum-
stantial evidence in light of the charge as a 
whole; State v. Theriault, Conn. , 
, 438 A.2d 432 (1980); State v. Roy, 173 
Conn. 35, 40, 376 A.2d 391 (1977); we are of 
the opinion that it was satisfactory and 
3. The defendant also claimed the court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury as he requested with 
two other paragraphs of his requested charge. 
Since this error has not been briefed, it is 
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correct. The charge as given adequately 
instructed the jury and gave them a clear 
understanding of circumstantial evidence. 
See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Commission on Hu-
man Rights & Opportunities, 172 Conn. 485, 
489-90, 374 A.2d 1104 (1977); State v. Scho-
enbneelt, 171 Conn. 119, 126, 368 A.2d 117 
(1976). 
There is no error. 
In this opinion the other Judges con-
curred. 
Cathleen HARDISTY 
v. 
Garwin D. HARDISTY. 
Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
Argued Jan. 8, 1981. 
Decided March 3, 1981. 
Former wife filed motion to modify 
support and alimony, alleging substantial 
and material changes in circumstances. 
The Superior Court, District of Waterbury, 
Bieluch, J., modified outstanding orders of 
alimony and support, and husband appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Peters, J., held 
that: (1) sustaining wife's objection to 
question posed to husband by husband's 
counsel about value of husband's restaurant 
if lease on property were no longer in effect 
was not an abuse of discretion; (2) sustain-
ing objection to question posed to husband 
by husband's counsel of whether husband 
might be unable to pay for college educa-
tion for son in event that husband was 
required to pay for a private secondary 
school education for son was not abuse of 
considered abandoned. State v. Washington, 
Conn. , , 438 A.2d 1144 (1980); 
State v. Ruiz, 171 Conn. 264, 265, 368 A.2d 222 
(1976). 
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discretion; (3) conclusion that there had 
been sufficient change of circumstances so 
that trial court could properly entertain mo-
tion for modification of alimony and sup-
port was not error; (4) modification of 
award of alimony and award of support for 
daughter was not error, but (5) modification 
of support award for son to require husband 
to pay son's expenses at private secondary 
school was abuse of discretion, as was 
award of $3,000 retroactive support for past 
private secondary school expenses. 
Error in part; remanded for further 
proceedings. 
1. Divorce ^245(3), 309.3(1) 
In proceeding brought by wife to modi-
fy husband's alimony and child support pay-
ments, sustaining wife's objection to ques-
tion posed to husband by husband's counsel 
about value of husband's restaurant if lease 
on property were no longer in effect was 
not abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce <3=>309.3(1) 
In proceeding brought by wife to modi-
fy husband's alimony and child support pay-
ments, sustaining wife's objection to ques-
tion posed to husband by husband's counsel 
as to husband's ability to pay for college 
education for son in event that husband 
were required to pay for a private second-
ary school education for son was not abuse 
of discretion. 
3. Divorce <s=>245(3), 309.6 
Conclusion that there had been suffi-
cient change of circumstances in financial 
affairs of husband whose income in four 
years since divorce was two and one half to 
three times what it had been at time of 
divorce and whose assets were five times as 
valuable, so that trial court could properly 
entertain motion for modification of alimo-
ny and child support was not error. 
4. Divorce <s=>245(2), 309.2(2) 
Proceeding to modify alimony and child 
support payments may be premised upon 
showing of substantial change in circum-
stances of either party to original decree. 
C.G.S.A. § 46-54 (Repealed). 
5. Divorce <s=>245(2), 3092(1) 
Once trial court determines that there 
has been substantial change in financial 
circumstances of one of the parties, same 
criteria that determined initial award of 
alimony and child support are relevant to 
question of modification; these require 
court to consider, without limitation, needs 
and financial resources of each of parties 
and their children, as well as such factors as 
health, age and station in life. C.G.S.A. 
§§ 46-52, 46-57 (Repealed.) 
6. Divorce e=>245(l), 309.4 
In making its determination of applica-
bility of criteria relevant to question of 
modification of award of alimony and child 
support, trial court has broad discretion. 
7. Divorce @=>245(2), 309.2(3) 
Modification of award of alimony to 
wife from $125 to $225 weekly, and of 
award of support for daughter from $45 to 
$75 weekly was not error in light of hus-
band's markedly altered financial circum-
stances and substantial change in age, 
health, station and needs of both wife and 
daughter. 
8. Divorce <s=>245(3), 309.6 
Trial court's conclusion that it had tak-
en into account all statutory criteria rele-
vant to modifying award of alimony or 
child support is sufficient without distinct, 
special findings about each of such criteria. 
C.G.S.A. §§ 46-52, 46-57 (Repealed). 
9. Divorce e=*309.2(l) 
Right of custodial parent to make edu-
cational choices is insufficient basis, absent 
showing of special need or some other com-
pelling justification, for increasing support 
obligation of noncustodial parent who genu-
inely doubts value of program that he is 
being asked to underwrite. 
10. Divorce e=>309.4 
Modification of support award for son 
to require ex-husband to pay son's expenses 
at private secondary school was abuse of 
discretion especially since ex-husband be-
lieved that son's enrollment at such school 
was unnecessary and undesirable. 
HARDISTY v 
Cite as, Conn., 
Thomas F. McDermott, Jr., Litchfield, 
with whom, on the brief, was Emmet P. 
Nichols, Waterbury, for appellant (defend-
ant). 
Robert D. Houston, Huntington, with 
whom, on the brief, were Ralph C. Crozier, 
Bridgeport, and Arnold M. Potash, Seym-
our, for appellee (plaintiff). 
Before BOGDANSKI, PETERS, AR-
THUR H. HEALEY, ARMENTANO and 
WRIGHT, JJ. 
PETERS, Associate Justice. 
This is an appeal from the modification of 
orders of alimony and support. The princi-
pal issue is the propriety of an order in-
creasing support to cover expenses arising 
out of the private secondary schooling of 
the parties' son. 
The marriage between the plaintiff Cath-
leen Hardisty and the defendant Garwin D. 
Hardisty was dissolved, on April 3, 1974, at 
the initiative of the plaintiff upon a finding 
of irretrievable breakdown. The state ref-
eree to whom the matter had been referred, 
Hon. John R. Thim, sitting as the trial 
court, at that time entered certain orders 
pursuant to the agreement of the parties. 
Those orders awarded custody of the par-
ties' two minor children to the plaintiff, and 
required the defendant to pay lump sum 
alimony of $20,000, periodic alimony of $125 
weekly and support of $45 weekly for each 
child. 
The plaintiff filed, on July 12, 1977, a 
motion to modify support and alimony, 
alleging substantial and material changes in 
circumstances, in particular the son An-
drew's admission to the Kent School, a pri-
vate secondary school for boys, for the fol-
lowing fall. The defendant countered with 
a motion to modify custody, which ultimate-
ly was denied; no appeal has been taken 
from that denial. The defendant also con-
tested the motion for modification of alimo-
ny and support which had, in the meantime, 
been amended to allege, as an additional 
ground for modification, a substantial and 
material change in the defendant's financial 
circumstances. 
HARDISTY Conn. 309 
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After a full hearing at which the parties 
presented their evidence, and after a con-
ference with the minor children, the court, 
Bieluch, J., modified the outstanding orders 
of alimony and support to: increase alimo-
ny from $125 to $225 weekly; increase sup-
port for the daughter Laura from $45 to 
$75 weekly; and increase support for the 
son Andrew from $45 to $150 weekly. In 
addition, the defendant was ordered to pay 
a lump sum of $3000 retroactive support for 
Andrew, representing half of his Kent 
School expenses for the previous year. This 
appeal by the defendant ensued. 
The defendant has raised seven claims of 
error. The first two attack the accuracy of 
the trial court's finding of facts, while the 
third attacks the court's conclusions as un-
supported by the findings. The fourth 
claim contests two evidentiary rulings. The 
fifth, sixth and seventh claims all contest 
the propriety of the trial court's conclusions 
that a sufficient change of circumstances 
had been shown to warrant modification of 
the support and alimony orders. 
I 
The defendant's extensive attack on the 
trial court's finding of facts proves, on ex-
amination, to be, with one exception, 
groundless. We correct the finding to in-
corporate the undisputed fact that neither 
the defendant nor any member of his fami-
ly had received primary or secondary level 
education at any private school. The other 
facts in the defendant's draft findings 
which the trial court refused to find were 
either incorporated in other findings which 
the court did make, or were not undisputed. 
The finding is thus not otherwise subject to 
material correction. Jennings v. Reale Con-
struction Co., 175 Conn. 16, 17-18, 392 A.2d 
962 (1978); E & F Realty Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Transportation, 173 Conn. 247, 
249, 377 A.2d 302 (1977). The defendant's 
challenge to the facts as found is equally 
unpersuasive. In each case, there was evi-
dence before the trial court which, if be-
lieved, would have provided an adequate 
basis for the finding actually made. That is 
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all that is required. Fricke v. Fricke, 174 
Conn. 602, 603, 392 A.2d 473 (1978); El 
Idrissi v. El Idrissi, 173 Conn. 295, 298, 377 
A.2d 330 (1977). 
The defendant has also assigned error to 
the trial court's conclusions of fact, as dis-
tinguished from its findings of fact, with 
regard to material and substantial changes 
of the circumstances of the parties and of 
their children. These claims will be con-
sidered below in connection with the de-
fendant's substantive challenges to the trial 
court's conclusions. 
[1,2] The defendant's evidentiary 
claims ask us to find error in the exclusion 
of the answers to two questions posed to 
the defendant by his own counsel. The 
first question arose as follows: The defend-
ant's earnings were found to have come in 
part from his ownership and operation of a 
restaurant known as the Curtis House. The 
defendant was asked what the value of this 
restaurant would be if the lease on the 
property were no longer in effect. The 
plaintiff objected that this inquiry was 
speculative; the plaintiff's objection was 
sustained and the defendant properly ex-
cepted to this ruling. The second question 
arose out of an inquiry into the defendant's 
ability to pay for his son's secondary educa-
tion at a private school. The defendant 
was asked whether he might be unable to 
pay for a college education for his son in 
the event that he were required to spend 
money for a secondary school such as Kent. 
Again, the plaintiff objected that the ques-
tion involved speculation and, upon the trial 
court's ruling that the answer be excluded, 
the defendant properly excepted. Both of 
these rulings by the trial court fall within 
its broad discretionary power to determine 
the relevancy or remoteness of evidence. 
Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 649-50, 
368 A.2d 172 (1976); Doran v. Wolk, 170 
Co:m. 226, 232, 365 A.2d 1190 (1976). There 
was no error in these evidentiary rulings. 
II 
The major thrust of the defendant's ap-
peal is that the trial court erred in conclud-
1. "[General Statutes] Sec. 46b-86. (Formerly 
Sec. 46-54). MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY 
ing that the plaintiff had demonstrated a 
substantial and unforeseen change in the 
circumstances existing at the time of the 
original decree dissolving the marriage be-
tween the parties, and that the court 
abused its discretion in modifying the or-
ders of alimony and support. 
The facts found by the trial court that 
pertain to the modification establish that 
there was a substantial change in the finan-
cial circumstances of the defendant be-
tween 1974 and 1978. His gross income in 
1978 was two and one-half to three times 
what it had been previously, and his assets, 
including the two restaurants he owned, 
were five times as valuable. Although his 
1978 financial affidavit listed considerable 
indebtedness, most of these debts were in-
terfamily obligations. The 1978 affidavit 
overstated his expenses, since it did not 
reveal that a mortgage loan represented a 
joint indebtedness with his present wife and 
did not disclose that some of his listed ex-
penses were paid by his wife. The defend-
ant's salary and benefits were received 
from the corporations which he owned; he 
himself set these amounts, and was de-
terred by federal tax regulations from set-
ting a higher salary. The 1978 affidavit did 
not disclose that the defendant had the free 
use of a car for which the defendant's cor-
poration paid gasoline, upkeep and insur-
ance. By contrast, the 1974 financial affi-
davit of the defendant failed to disclose the 
ownership of any restaurants, and reported 
markedly lower income and assets. 
[3,4] There was thus no error in the 
trial court's conclusion that there had been 
a sufficient change of circumstances so that 
the court could properly entertain a motion 
for modification of alimony and support. 
Under our statutes and cases, modification 
may be premised "upon a showing of sub-
stantial change in the circumstances of ei-
ther party [to the original decree.]" (Em-
phasis added.) General Statutes § 46-54 
(now § 46b-86);l Grinold v. Grinold, 172 
OR SUPPORT ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS, 
(a) Unless and to the extent that the decree 
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Conn. 192, 195, 374 A.2d 172 (1976); Vi- station in life. General Statutes, § 46-52 
glione v. Vighone, 171 Conn. 213, 215, 368 (now § 46b-82), and § 46-57 (now § 46b-
A.2d 202 (1976); see Clark, Domestic Rela- 84),2 Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn 
tions § 14.9. 218> 221 ' 4 2 9 A^ 4 7 4 (1980), Jacobsen v. 
Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 264, 413 A.2d 854 
[5, 6] Once a trial court determines that (1979), [n making its determination of the 
there has been a substantial change in the applicability of these criteria, the trial court 
financial circumstances of one of the par- has broad discretion, "[t]he test is whether 
ties, the same criteria that determine an the court could reasonably conclude as it 
initial award of alimony and support are did" Koizim \. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492, 
relevant to the question of modification. 497, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980); Noce v. Noce, 
Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 401- 181 Conn. 145, 150, 434 A.2d 345 (1980); 
402, 378 A.2d 522 (1977); see Clark, Domes- Aguire v. Aguire, 171 Conn. 312, 314, 370 
tic Relations § 14.9, pp. 456-57. These re- A.2d 948 (1976) 
quire the court to consider, without hmita- Our review is limited to deciding wrhether 
tion, the needs and financial resources of the trial court has abused its legal discre-
each of the parties and their children, as tion. As we have repeatedly noted, "trial 
well as such factors as health, age and courts have a distinct advantage over an 
precludes modification, any final order for the 
periodic payment of permanent alimony or sup-
port or alimony or support pendente lite may at 
any time thereafter be continued, set aside, 
altered or modified by said court upon a show-
ing of a substantial change in the circumstanc-
es of either party This section shall not apply 
to assignments under section 46b-81 or to any 
assignment of the estate or a portion thereof of 
one party to the other party under prior law 
"(b) In an action for divorce, dissolution of 
marriage, legal separation or annulment 
brought by a husband or wife, in which a final 
judgment has been entered providing for the 
payment of periodic alimony by one party to 
the other, the superior court may, in its discre-
tion and upon notice and hearing, modify such 
judgment and suspend, reduce or terminate the 
payment of periodic alimony upon a showing 
that the party receiving the periodic alimony is 
living with another person under circumstances 
which the court finds should result in the modi-
fication, suspension, reduction or termination 
of alimony because the living arrangements 
cause such a change of circumstances as to 
alter the financial needs of that party " 
2. "[General Statutes] Sec 46b-82. (Formerly 
Sec. 46-52). ALIMONY. At the time of enter-
ing the decree, the superior court may order 
either of the parties to pay alimony to the 
other, in addition to or in lieu of an award 
pursuant to section 46b-81. The order may 
direct that security be given therefor on such 
terms as the court may deem desirable In 
determining whether alimony shall be awarded, 
and the duration and amount of the award, the 
court shall hear the witnesses, if any, of each 
party, except as provided in subsection (a) of 
section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the 
marriage, the causes for the annulment, disso-
lution of the marriage or legal separation, the 
age, health, station, occupation, amount and 
sources of income, vocational skills, employa-
bility, estate and needs of each of the parties 
and the award if any, which the court may 
make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the 
case of a parent to whom the custody of minor 
children has been awarded, the desirability of 
such parent's securing employment" 
"[General Statutes] Sec 46b-84 (Formerly 
Sec 46-57) PARENTS' OBLIGATION FOR 
MAINTENANCE OF MINOR CHILD (a) 
Upon or subsequent to the annulment or disso-
lution of any marriage or the entry of a decree 
of legal separation or divorce, the parents of a 
minor child of the marriage, shall maintain the 
child according to their respective abilities, if 
the child is in need of maintenance 
"(b) In determining whether a child is in 
need of maintenance and, if in need, the respec-
tive abilities of the parents to provide such 
maintenance and the amount thereof, the court 
shall consider the age, health, station, occupa-
tion, earning capacity, amount and sources of 
income, estate, vocational skills and employa-
bility of each of the parents, and the age, 
health, station, occupation, educational status 
and expectation, amount and sources of in-
come, vocational skills, employability, estate 
and needs of the child 
"(c) After the granting of a decree annulling 
or dissolving the marriage or ordering a legal 
separation, and upon complaint or motion with 
order and summons made to the superior court 
by either parent or by the commissioner of 
administrative services in any case arising un-
der subsection (a) of this section, the court 
shall inquire into the child's need of mainte-
nance and the respective abilities of the parents 
to supply maintenance The court shall make 
and enforce the decree for the maintenance of 
the child as it considers just, and may direct 
security to be given therefor " 
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appellate court in dealing with domestic 
relatione where all of the surrounding cir-
cumstances and the appearance and atti-
tude of the parties are so significant ' Ja-
cobsen v Jacobsen, supra, 177 Conn 262 
413 A 2d 854 Koizim v Koizim supra 181 
Conn at 498 435 \ 2d 1030 Fucci \ Fucci 
179 Conn 174, 181 425 A 2d 592 (1979) 
Grinold v Grinold, supra, 172 Conn 194, 374 
A 2d 172 
[7,8] Applying this test to the present 
appeal, we find no error in the trial court's 
modification of the award of alimony from 
$125 to $225 weekly, and the award of 
support for the daughter Laura from $45 to 
$75 weekly In light of the defendant's 
markedly altered financial circumstances, 
and the facts concerning the needs of the 
plaintiff and of Laura found by the court 
and disclosed by the plaintiff's financial af-
fidavit, granting these relative!} modest 
rrodifications cannot be characterized as an 
abuse of discretion The court expressh 
concluded that there was a substantial 
change in the circumstances of the plaintiff 
and of Laura, with respect, inter alia, to 
their age, health, station and needs A trial 
court's conclusion that it has taken into 
account all of the statutory criteria3 rele-
vant to an award of alimony or support is 
sufficient without distinct, special findings 
about each of these criteria Posada v 
Posada, 179 Conn 568, 573, 427 A 2d 406 
(1980), Fucci v Fucci, supra, 179 Conn at 
181, 425 A 2d 592 
The trial court also modified the order of 
support for the parties' son Andrew, in-
creasing that award from $45 to $150 a 
week That modification included expenses 
of $125 a week to enable Andrew to attend 
a private boarding school for boys, the Kent 
School The trial court expressly found 
that the plaintiff had enrolled Andrew in 
the Kent School without consulting the de-
fendant and that the plaintiff needs finan-
cial assistance from the defendant for An-
drew's continued enrollment at the Kent 
3. See General Statutes § 46-52 (now § 46b 
82), and § 46-57 (now § 46b-84) 
School The court found that Andrew is 
extremeh intelligent and wants to continue 
at the Kent School The court also found 
that the defendant is able to pa> for his 
son s education at the Kent School but 
refuses to do so because he believes a pri-
vate school at the secondary level is unnec-
essary and undesirable No one in the de-
fendant s family has ever received private 
primary or secondary education In review-
ing whether these findings suffice to estab-
lish a reasonable basis for an order to pay 
the increased order of support, we note 
further, that although the trial court re-
peatedly expressed its skepticism about the 
accuracv of the defendant's financial disclo-
sures,4 the court expressed no such doubts 
about the good faith of the defendant's 
objection to private secondary schooling 
This court has only once had the opportu-
nity to consider whether a parent mav be 
compelled to provide private school educa-
tion for his child In Cleveland v Cleve-
land, 161 Conn 452, 461, 289 A 2d 909 
(1971), we held that "courts have the power 
to direct one or both parents to pay for 
private schooling, if the circumstances war-
rant It is a matter to be determined in the 
sound discretion of the court on considera-
tion of the totality of the circumstances 
including the financial ability of the parties 
the availability of public schools, the schools 
attended by the children prior to the di-
vorce and the special needs and general 
welfare of the children Notes, 133 A L R 
902, 909, 56 A L R 2d 1207, 1215 " When 
that case returned to this court after action 
by the trial court upon remand, we recog-
nized, however that a noncustodial parent 
might reasonably and in good faith differ 
with a custodial parent as to what school 
would be most appropriate for a child at 
any particular time Cleveland v Cleve-
land, 165 Conn 95, 98 99, 328 A 2d 691 
(1973) When such a good faith dispute 
arose, we upheld the modification of a de-
cree which had ordered the noncustodial 
father to pay boarding school or college 
4 The court stated during the proceedings I 
will say for the record that this [the defendant s 
financial] affidavit was misleading to the 
Court 
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expenses on the condition that he be con-
sulted about the choice of the relevant edu-
cational institution The effect of the mod-
ification was to substitute a lump sum sup-
port obligation, in a lesser amount, for the 
prior obligation to pay all educational ex-
penses 
Like Cleveland v Cleveland, the cases in 
other jurisdictions reflect the tension be-
tween the right of the custodial parent to 
make educational decisions in the best in-
terests of the child and the right of the 
noncustodial parent, if asked to pay the bill, 
to take, in good faith, a different view of 
educational choices We have found no 
case, nor has any been cited to us, in vvhich 
a parent has been compelled to pa> the 
total cost of private schooling to which he 
objects because of a principled preference 
for public primary and secondary schooling 
Many of the cases denying such an obliga-
tion are distinguishable because the requi-
site financial ability to pay for such school-
ing was not established See, e g , Forman 
v Forman, 127 NYS2d 17 (Dom Rel Ct 
1954), Holt v Holt, 330 So 2d 489 (Fla App 
1976), Degoner v Degener, 478 S W 2d 687 
(Mo App 1972) Many of the cases affirm-
ing such an obligation are distinguishable 
because they, like Cleveland v Cle\ eland, 
involve interpretation of a prior agreement 
or divorce decree authorizing private school-
ing See, e g , Save// v Sa\ell, 213 Miss 
869, 58 So 2d 41 (1952), Bize v Bize, 154 
Neb 520, 48 N W 2d 649 (1951), Kern \ 
Kern, 65 Misc2d 765, 319 NYS2d 178 
(1970) Cf Van Nortwick v Van Nortwick, 
87 111 App 2d 55, 230 N E 2d 391 (1967) Al-
though some courts have indicated, in dic-
tum, that tuition at a private school was not 
an expense which a court could order a 
noncustodial parent to pay, Winston v 
Winston, 50 App Div 2d 527, 375 N Y S 2d 5 
(1975), Ziesel v Ziesel, 93 N J Eq 153, 157, 
115 A 435 (1921), in these cases there were 
5. It is important to recognize that this case 
involves private secondary schooling rather 
than college expenses The issues raised in the 
college cases on which we express no opinion 
are different in two respects from the case 
before us Because college bound children are 
normally over the age of 18 college expense 
cases pose an issue of support past the age of 
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also financial impediments to such an order 
of support Those courts that have ordered 
private school expenses to be paid were not 
confronted with principled objection to such 
schooling in Cappel v Cappel 243 Iowa 
1363, 1367, 55 N W 2d 481 (1952), there was, 
furthermore, some showing of special need, 
and in Williams v Barnette, 226 La 635, 
639, 76 So 2d 912 (1954), the parent ordered 
to pay school expenses did not appeal that 
order 
The case before us appears therefore to 
be a case of first impression, not onl> here 
but elsewhere in this countrv 5 The record 
before us is thus especially significant as we 
explore these uncharted waters That rec-
ord shows a gifted child, eager to go to a 
private secondary school, and a noncustodial 
parent with sufficient financial means to 
pay for such education What the record 
does not show is, however, equally reveal-
ing There is no showing of this child's 
special educational or psychological need for 
private schooling or of the inadequacy, in 
general or for this child, of the local public 
schools There is no showing that, but for 
this divorce, this child would probably have 
attended a private school, in fact, the de-
fendant's family history indicates the oppo-
site There is no showing that the defend-
ant ever agreed to private schooling for his 
son To the contrary, the trial court has 
found, as a fact, that the defendant believes 
that his son's enrollment at the Kent School 
is unnecessary and undesirable 
[9,10] We have come to accept the un-
fortunate reality that marital relationships 
sometimes break down irretrievably with-
out fault due to the emergence of irrecon-
cilable differences between the marital 
partners Joy v Joy, 178 Conn 254, 256, 
423 A 2d 895 (1979) The same irreconcila-
ble differences that led to the breakdown of 
minontv which is not involved in the case be 
fore us In the college expense cases further 
more there may be as Professor Clark sug-
gests a more cogent argument that such ex 
penses have become necessaries Clark Do 
mestic Relations § 15 1 pp 497-98 see an-
not 99 ALR3d 322 (1980) 
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the marriage often spill over into signifi-
cantly divergent views about child rearing. 
Seymour v. Seymour, 180 Conn. 705, 709, 
433 A.2d 1005 (1980). In order to minimize 
the disruptive impact of such conflicts upon 
the children of the marriage, custody may 
be awarded to one parent alone; Seymour 
v. Seymour, supra; or a monetary award 
substituted for divisive joint decision-mak-
ing. Cleveland v. Cleveland, supra, 165 
Conn. 101, 328 A.2d 691. The right of the 
custodial parent to make educational 
choices is, however, an insufficient basis, 
absent a showing of special need or some 
other compelling justification, for increas-
ing the support obligation of the noncusto-
dial parent who genuinely doubts the value 
of the program that he is being asked to 
underwrite. In the light of the totality of 
the circumstances in this case, we conclude 
therefore that the trial court abused its 
discretion in modifying the support award 
for Andrew Hardisty to require the defend-
ant to pay Andrew's expenses at the Kent 
School. For the same reason, the award of 
$3000 retroactive support for Andrew was 
also in error. 
It may be that the support order for 
Andrew should have been modified with 
regard to expenses other than those relat-
ing to his attendance at the Kent School. 
The original award for Andrew was modi-
fied in an amount less than the Kent School 
tuition. A remand is required to make a 
proper determination of what the defend-
ant's obligation to support Andrew should 
be. 
There is error and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
In this opinion the other Judges con-
curred. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
BEAD CHAIN MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY 
v. 
SAXTON PRODUCTS, INC. 
Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
Argued Jan. 9, 1981. 
Decided March 3, 1981. 
Action was brought for breach of a 
contract for purchase of specially manufac-
tured electronic parts. The Superior Court, 
Fairfield County, Saden, J., entered judg-
ment for seller on complaint and on buyer's 
counterclaim, and appeal was taken. The 
Supreme Court, Peters, J., held that: (1) 
buyer's protracted delay in rejecting elec-
tronic parts tendered by seller, coupled with 
its delay in notifying seller of the alleged 
nonconformity, obligated buyer to accept 
delivery; (2) provision of purchase order 
which required buyer to pay seller $3,475 
for fitting-up charges for tooling and giv-
ing buyer exclusive use without limitation 
of parts as shown in Sketch S-1318 did not 
entitle buyer to ownership of tools manu-
factured by seller to produce the parts; and 
(3) buyer's conduct in refusing to accept 
parts shipped to it in 1974 and in refusing 
to pay tooling charges constituted a breach 
of contract. 
No error. 
1. Sales e=> 178(3) 
Even though purchase order made time 
of the essence, buyer was obligated to ac-
cept late delivery of electronic parts from 
seller, in that there was a protracted delay 
in rejection of parts tendered by seller, and 
there was delay in notification to seller of 
alleged nonconformity of parts, which was 
readily apparent at time of tender. C.G. 
S.A. §§ 42a-2-513(l), 42a-2-602(l), 42a-2-
606(lXb). 
2. Sales s=>3 
Provision of purchase order which re-
quired buyer to pay seller $3,475 as fitting-
up charges for tooling and gave buyer "ex-
EXHIBIT C 
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mined in this case. The defense hoped to 
show that because Tracy had not contract-
ed the herpes virus, it was unlikely that 
sexual contact between her and defendant 
had occurred. 
"As a general rule the resolution of 
questions of evidentiary relevance, materi-
ality and admissibility rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial justice; his ruling 
will not constitute reversible error unless it 
is a prejudicial abuse of discretion.,, State 
v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1386 (R.I.1980). 
The trial justice must first determine 
whether the evidence being offered falls 
within the definition of relevant evidence 
provided by the Rhode Island Rules of Evi-
dence. Even when the evidence is rele-
vant, it is not automatically admissible. 
The trial court must assess whether the 
offered evidence, though relevant, is un-
fairly prejudicial to the opposing party or 
would mislead or confuse the jury. 
R.I.R.Evid. 403. 
The evidence that defense counsel 
sought to introduce was that the defendant 
had been diagnosed as having herpes sim-
plex 1 and 2 prior to the alleged sexual 
assault. The medical experts could not tes-
tify about whether defendant was experi-
encing a period during which the virus 
would have been transmittable at the time 
of the assault. They also could not testify 
to whether a single contact would have 
passed the vims to the victim. The rele-
vance of such testimony was tenuous at 
best. It would have been of little help to 
the jury in deciding the issues in the case, 
could easily have mislead or confused the 
jury, and was properly excluded by the 
trial justice under Rule 403 of our rules of 
evidence. 
For these reasons the defendant's appeal 
is denied and dismissed, the judgment of 
conviction appealed from is affirmed, and 
the papers of the case are remanded to the 
Superior Court. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Roger L. PONTBRIAND 
v. 
Virginia May PONTBRIAND. 
No. 91-517-M.P. 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 
March 29, 1993. 
Wife filed motion to have husband held 
in contempt for unilaterally reducing child 
support payments provided for by divorcee 
decree. The Family Court, O'Brien, Mas-
ter, modified support, adjudged husband to 
be in contempt, and husband petitioned for 
certiorari. The Supreme Court, Shea, J., 
held that: (1) child-support obligation of 
noncustodial spouse may be offset by So-
cial Security benefits paid to children on 
behalf of that parent, and (2) husband did 
not demonstrate any willful disregard for 
court's order in reducing payments to ac-
count for the Social Security benefits. 
Appeal sustained, judgment vacated, 
petition for certiorari granted, order modi-
fying support quashed, and case remanded. 
1. Parent and Child <s=>3.3(9) 
Child-support obligation of a noncusto-
dial spouse may be offset by Social Securi-
ty benefits made to dependent children on 
behalf of that parent 
2. Divorce 0=^311(2) 
The reduction in the husband's disabili-
ty pension to reflect Social Security bene-
fits paid to husband and his children should 
have been considered by trial court in pro-
ceeding on motion by wife to adjudge hus-
band in contempt for unilaterally reducing 
child support payments based upon what 
children received from Social Security on 
his behalf; to ignore the reduction in pen-
sion would be inequitable. 
3. Divorce <s=309.2(2) 
Payment of Social Security benefits to 
children on husband's behalf could be con-
sidered change in circumstances warrant-
PONTBRIAND v 
Cite as 622 A.2d 
ng modification of husband's child support 
obligation under divorce decree. 
L Divorce <s=>308 
Husband was not required to seek 
nodification of divorce decree before re-
hiring child support payments when Social 
Security benefits were made available to 
iependent children; instead of seeking for-
mal modification from Family Court, hus-
5and would be required to inform Family 
Court that source of income had changed 
md that credit would be taken. 
5. Divorce <3>309.2(3) 
Trial court's modification of child sup-
port order, under which husband was 
granted no credit for Social Security bene-
fits paid to children, with result that 
amount of support payments together with 
Social Security benefits increased funds 
available for support of children without 
showing of additional need, was clearly 
wrong. 
6. Contempt <3=*20 
Party who disregards valid court order 
in favor of his own notion of justice should 
be adjudged in contempt. 
7. Parent and Child <e=>3.3(9) 
In contempt proceedings involving 
child support obligation, respondent can 
raise question of his lack of willfulness and 
his inability to pay. 
8. Contempt <^61(2) 
Whether party is willful in his disobe-
dience of court order is question of fact. 
9. Contempt <3=>66(7) 
In reviewing judgment of contempt, 
decision of trial court is given great defer-
ence and will not be disturbed absent clear 
abuse. 
10. Divorce <s=>311(2) 
Finding of contempt against former 
husband who reduced child support pay-
ments, on advice of counsel to account for 
Social Security benefits paid for benefit of 
children, was error; husband did not dem-
onstrate any willful disregard for court's 
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Brenda Coville Harrigan, Gunning, LaFa-
zia & Gnys, Providence, for plaintiff. 
David Strachman, Lipsey & Skolnik, 
Providence, for defendant. 
OPINION 
SHEA, Justice. 
The plaintiff, Roger L. Pontbriand (Rog-
er), and the defendant, Virginia May 
Pontbriand (Virginia), were divorced by fi-
nal decree on November 16, 1990. The 
plaintiff has petitioned this court for the 
issuance of a writ of certiorari to review 
the trial master's failure to give the plain-
tiff a dollar-for-dollar credit against his 
child-support obligation for payments r e 
ceived by his children from Social Security 
through their representative and the trial 
master's failure to consider the children's 
receipt of dependency benefits from Social 
Security in the calculation of the husband's 
child-support obligation. The plaintiff also 
appeals from the trial master's adjudging 
him in willful contempt. We quash the 
judgment regarding the change in the child 
support, and we sustain the appeal from 
the finding of contempt. 
Pursuant to a final divorce decree Roger 
was required to pay Virginia the sum of 
$575 per month as child support. This 
figure derived from the child-support-
guideline worksheet, was based upon Rog-
er's monthly gross income of $2,000. At 
the time of the divorce his monthly gross 
income consisted of medical benefits that 
he received from the Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Association College Retire-
ment Equities Fund (TIAA/CREF) as a 
result of his disability retirement from the 
Rhode Island School of Design in March 
1990. Roger's monthly income was deter-
mined by calculating 60 percent of his 
wage base versus the total sum of benefits 
received from other sources. Under the 
TIAA/CREF plan benefits from other 
sources include moneys paid to either plain-
tiff himself or to his codependents. Thus 
Roger's monthly benefits from TIAA/ 
CREF would be reduced by the amount of 
any monthly Social Security benefits that 
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Commencing December 1990, Roger and 
his dependents were entitled to receive So-
cial Security benefits. The monthly total 
was $1,488.40. Of that total amount 
$992.30 was payable directly to plaintiff, 
and $496.10 was payable directly to defen-
dant as the children's representative. On 
November 23, 1990, TIAA/CREF notified 
plaintiff that since he was receiving Social 
Security benefits, his monthly TIAA/CREF 
payments would be reduced by the total 
amount that he and his dependents were 
receiving in Social Security benefits 
($1,488.40). The plaintiffs monthly benefit 
from TIAA/CREF was recalculated at 
$745.46 per month. 
Roger, without leave of court, began 
making child-support payments of only $79 
per month ($575 minus the $496 that his 
children were receiving directly from Social 
Security). Under this formulation the chil-
dren would still receive the required $575 
but now from two sources. In addition he 
filed a motion to modify the child-support 
order on December 13, 1990, to reflect the 
change in the source of his total income. 
On January 4, 1991, Virginia filed a motion 
to adjudge Roger in contempt for paying 
only $79 rather than the $575 ordered. 
At the subsequent hearing on June 3, 
1991, the trial master ruled that Roger 
erred in making a dollar-for-dollar reduc-
tion of his child-support payments based 
upon what his children received from Social 
Security on his behalf. Since Roger unilat-
erally reduced his support payments, the 
master found him in contempt of the di-
vorce decree. The trial master did consider 
his motion to modify support based on his 
reduction in income and reduced his sup-
port obligation to $454 per month. 
The benefits received by the children 
were not considered in this modification. 
As a result of the deduction in Roger's 
gross income, a new child-support calcula-
tion was made. Consequently Roger's indi-
vidual child-support obligation was reduced 
to $454 per month. Under this modifica-
tion the dependent children would now re-
ceive both the $454 per month from Roger 
1. See also Annot., Right to Credit on Child Sup-
port Payments for Social Securtrv or Other Gov-
and the $496-per-month benefit from So-
cial Security, for a total of $950 per month. 
Thus the children would be allowed $375 
more per month than the original support 
order of $575 per month without any show-
ing of increased need. 
Roger asserted first that he should be 
allowed a direct credit of $496 per month 
toward his child-support obligation for the 
money that the children receive from Social 
Security on his behalf. Under this reason-
ing, he argues, he should only be required 
to pay $79 per month for the difference 
between the child-support order and the 
Social Security benefit. In the alternative 
he requested that the support order be 
modified to reflect his decrease in gross 
income and the increase in funds available 
to the children from Social Security. The 
modification he seeks would require him 
under a new order to pay only the $79. 
I 
[1] We first address plaintiffs request 
for a direct credit. The allowance of a 
credit for Social Security payments has not 
been raised previously in Rhode Island. 
We shall therefore look to the experience 
of the states that have considered the ques-
tion.1 
The overwhelming majority of states 
that have considered this issue allow a 
credit for Social Security benefits paid to 
dependent children. Windham v. State, 
574 So.2d 853 (Ala.Civ.App.1990) (citing 
Binns v. Maddox, 57 Ala.App. 230, 327 
So.2d 726 (1976)); Cash v. Cash, 234 Ark. 
603, 353 S.W.2d 348 (1962); Lopez v. Lo-
pez, 125 Ariz. 309, 609 P.2d 579 (Ct.App. 
1980); In re Marriage of Denny, 115 Cal. 
App.3d 543, 171 Cal.Rptr. 440 (1981); Per-
teet v. Sumner, 246 Ga. 182, 269 S.E.2d 
453 (1980) (citing Horton v. Horton, 219 
Ga. 177, 132 S.E.2d 200 (1963)); Newman 
v. Newman, 451 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1990) 
(citing Potts v. Potts, 240 N.W.2d 680 
(Iowa 1976)); Childerson v. Hess. 198 111. 
App.3d 395, 144 Ill.Dec. 551, 555 N.E.2d 
1070 (1990); Poynter v. Poynter, 590 
ernment Dependency Payments Made for Benefit 
of Child, 11 A.L.RJd 1315 (1977 & 19^2 Supp.;. 
PONTBRtSND v 
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N.E.2d 150 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992); Andler v. 
Andler, 217 Kan. 538, 538 P.2d 649 (1975); 
McCloud v. McCloud, 544 So.2d 764 (La.Ct. 
App.1989) (citing Folds « Lebert, 420 So.2d 
715 (La.Ct.App. 1982)); Frens v. Frens, 191 
Mich.App. 654, 478 N.W.2d 750 (1991); 
Mooneyham v. Mooneyham, 420 So.2d 
1072 (Miss. 1982); Weaks v. Weaks, 821 
S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1991); Hanthorn v. Hant-
horn, 236 Neb. 225, 460 N.W.2d 650 (1990) 
(citing Schulze v. Jensen, 191 Neb. 253, 214 
N.W.2d 591 (1974)); Griffin v. Avery, 120 
N.H. 783, 424 A.2d 175 (1980); Romero v. 
Romero, 101 N.M. 345, 682 P.2d 201 (Ct. 
App.1984); Guthmiller v. Guthmiller, 448 
N.W.2d 643 (N.D.1989); Davis v. Davis, 
141 Vt. 398, 449 A.2d 947 (1982). 
In addition several states have extended 
this same principle to Social Security bene-
fits paid to children as survivor's benefits. 
Bowden v. Bowden, 426 So.2d 448 (Ala.Civ. 
App. 1983) (applying North Carolina law); 
In re Marriage of Meek, 669 P.2d 628 
(Colo.Ct.App. 1983); Board v. Board, 690 
S.W.2d 380 (Ky.1985); Cohen v. Murphy, 
368 Mass. 144, 330 N.E.2d 473 (1975). In 
these states, direct credit is given to the 
decedent's estate for death benefits pay-
able to the surviving children. 
We shall adopt the rationale of the ma-
jority of the states and allow the child-
support obligations of a noncustodial 
spouse to be offset by the Social Security 
benefits paid to dependent children on be-
half of that parent. The rationale for al-
lowing a credit is perhaps best stated by a 
recent Indiana decision on the issue. "The 
rationale is that the social security benefits 
are not gratuities but are earned, and they 
substitute for lost earning power because 
of the disability." Poynter v. Poynter, 590 
N.E.2d at 152. Similarly the Vermont 
court recognized that equitable consider-
ations require that a credit be given when 
it stated that: 
"[E]quity and fairness demand that con-
sideration be given to government child 
support benefits paid to the party having 
custody. These payments are, in a 
sense, a substitute for wages the obligor 
would have received but for the disabili-
ty, and from which the court ordered 
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made. * * * In theory, at least, the ac-
tual source of payments is of no concern 
to the party having custody as long as 
they are in fact made." Davis v. Davis, 
141 Vt. at 401, 449 A.2d at 948. 
The Missouri court rejected its previous 
determination in Craver v. Craver, 649 
S.W.2d 440 (Mo. 1983), which disallowed the 
credit, in favor of the' majority view. 
Weaks v. Weaks, 821 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1991). 
In reviewing the proper focus of the inqui-
ry, the Weaks court explained that "the 
key fact is that the benefits paid to the 
children are derived from funds 'earned' by 
the contributer." Id. at 506. 'The focus 
of the inquiry should be whether the pur-
pose of child support is satisfied by the 
receipt of the social security benefits." Id 
(citing Horton v. Horton, 219 Ga. 177, 132 
S.E.2d at 201; Potts v. Potts, 240 N.W.2d 
at 681). Since Social Security benefits are 
specifically provided to replace lost income, 
it would be "inequitable to withhold a cred-
it against the child support obligation." 
Weaks, 821 S.W.2d at 506. 
The Missouri court in Weaks went even 
further and pronounced that the minority 
rule requiring the petitioner to seek a modi-
fication in order to get a credit "is harsh 
and unjust." Id. 
"In situations involving disability bene-
fits, the party seeking credit most likely 
faces a reduction of income, financial un-
certainty, physical or mental impairment 
and other attendant consequences of the 
disability. The additional burden of peti-
tioning the court for a modification typi-
cally wastes time and money and helps 
no one." Id. at 506-07. 
Direct credit should be given to the noncus-
todial spouse, when the receipt of Social 
Security benefits is "merely a change in 
the identity of the payer." Id. at 507 (cit-
ing Board v. Board, 690 S.W.2d at 381). 
[2] In the present case the Pontbriand 
children were entitled to receive benefits 
from Social Security because of the earned 
contributions made by the father. The 
benefits received were paid because of 
their father's disability. His pension was 
TOAUOM\ tn amount for this additional in-
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come from Social Security and intended to 
substitute for a portion of his pension in-
come. To ignore the fact that Roger's 
income from TIAA/CREF was reduced to 
reflect dependency benefits paid to him and 
his children would be inequitable. Rogers 
income base did not change, but rather the 
source. Following the line of cases recog-
nizing that the Social Security benefits paid 
to the children are a substitute for earned 
income, we must give Roger credit toward 
his childO-support obligation for the Social 
Security benefits paid. 
[3,4] In a minority of states the allow-
ance of a credit has been limited by requir-
ing the petitioner to seek a modification 
from the court. The Social Security benefit 
to the children may be considered a change 
in circumstance that warrants a modifica-
tion. In re Estate of Patterson, 167 Ariz. 
168, 805 P.2d 401 (1991); Arnoldt v. Ar-
nolds 147 Misc.2d 37, 554 N.Y.S.2d 396 
(1990); Children Youth & Services v. 
Chorgo, 341 Pa.Super. 512, 491 A.2d 1374 
(1985); Chase v. Chase, 74 Wash.2d 253, 
444 P.2d 145 (1968); Farley v. Farley, 186 
W.Va. 263, 412 S.E.2d 261 (1991); Hinckley 
v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907 (Wyo.1991). We 
decline to follow the states that require a 
petitioner to seek a modification for a re-
duction in child-support payments when So-
cial Security benefits are available to the 
dependent children. Instead of seeking a 
formal modification from the Family Court 
that considers the Social Security benefit, 
we require a noncustodial parent to inform 
the Family Court, that the source of income 
has changed and that a credit will be taken. 
"There is a distinction between crediting an 
obligation with payment made from anoth-
er source and increasing, decreasing or ter-
minating, or otherwise modifying a specific 
dollar amount." Board v. Board, 690 
S.W.2d at 381. A child-support obligor 
may reduce or suspend payments for sup-
port of the children only after petitioning 
the Family Court. Grissom v. Patvtucket 
Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1065 (R.I. 1989). 
In this case Roger is not seeking a reduc-
tion or suspension of the payments but 
rather a credit for the change in source of 
payments. No modification is necessary. 
The Family Court and custodial spouse 
need only be notified that the support order 
is being met through different sources. 
II 
[5] In light of this finding plaintiffs 
alternative argument that the trial justice 
erred in failing to consider the additional 
income that the children were receiving 
through Social Security is no longer the 
focus of our inquiry. We have held re-
peatedly that an order modifying a child-
support decree will not be disturbed unless 
that order is based on findings that are 
clearly wrong. Meehan v. Meehan, 603 
A.2d 333 (R.I. 1992). Our conclusion that a 
direct credit should have been granted war-
rants a finding here that the trial master's 
modification of the support order, consider-
ing only Roger's decreased income without 
any showing of additional need for the 
children, was clearly wrong. 
Ill 
[6-8] We now move to the issue of con-
tempt. A party who disregards a valid 
court order in favor of his own notion of 
justice should be adjudged in contempt. 
"A contempt order * * * relates to the 
power of the Family Court to vindicate the 
authority of its decrees by coercing a re-
spondent into obedience thereto." 
Lippman v. Kay, 415 A.2d 738, 742 (R.I. 
1980). In these contempt proceedings a 
respondent can raise the question of his 
lack of willfulness and his inability to pay. 
Id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 114 R.I. 117, 
120, 329 A.2d 200, 201 (1974)). Whether a 
party is willful in his disobedience is a 
question of fact Borozny v. Paine, 122 
R.I. 701, 707, 411 A.2d 304, 307 (1980). 
[9,10] In reviewing an adjudgment of 
contempt, the decision of the trial justice is 
given great deference and will not be dis-
turbed absent a clear abuse. Williams v. 
Williams, 429 A.2d 450, 454 (R.I.1981). In 
this case we conclude that the trial master 
erred in finding contempt. By reducing his 
payments to $79, on advice of counsel, to 
account for the difference between the So-
HARRIS v. TURCHETTA 
Cite as 622 fL2d 487 (ILL 1993) 
R.I. 487 
cial Security benefits and the support or-
der, Roger did not demonstrate any willful 
disregard for the court's order. In fact it 
appears that he went out of his way to 
ensure that the exact dollar amount to 
which his children were entitled was met. 
For these reasons the plaintiffs appeal 
from the contempt order is sustained, and 
that judgment is vacated. The petition for 
certiorari is granted, and the order modify-
ing the child support is quashed. The pa-
pers of the case are remanded to the Fami-
ly Court with our decision endorsed there-
on. 
tablished arrearages in sum of $5,464 and 
it was unnecessary for trial justice to take 
judicial notice of stipulation for judgment 
that had been entered in district court in 
that amount; (3) any error by trial justice 
taking judicial notice of judgment stipula-
tion was harmless in light of other evi-
dence; and (4) wife was sufficiently in-
volved in business so that she was principal 
and was personally liable for corporate 
debts after corporation ceased to exist. 
Appeals 
firmed. 
dismissed; judgment af-
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Alexander TURCHETTA d.b.a. Camille's 
Coffee Shop, Inc. et al. 
No. 91-566-Appeal. 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 
March 31, 1993. 
Landlord sued seeking possession of 
certain premises as well as judgment for 
back rent. The district court entered judg-
ment by stipulation of parties against ten-
ants in amount of $5,464 plus interest from 
back rent and also for possession of prem-
ises. Tenants appealed. After case was 
referred to arbitration and award was en-
tered for landlords, tenants rejected award 
and sought trial de novo in Supenor Court. 
The Superior Court, Providence County, 
Rodgers, J., entered judgment for land-
lords in amount of $5,464 with interest and 
costs. Tenants appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Weisberger, J., held that: (1) busi-
ness was not de facto corporation after 
revocation of its charter by Secretary of 
State, and thus, owners were personally 
liable for back rent; (2) ledger card in 
/»Aninnr»tinn w i t h mannorpr'q t/»«tiinr»nv PS-
1. Corporations <£=»349, 617(1) 
Company was not de facto corporation 
after revocation by Secretary of State of its 
articles of association due to its failure to 
file reports, and thus, principal officers of 
company who continued to do business un-
der corporate name after charter had been 
revoked were personally4iable for rent as-
sessed against company by landlord. 
2. Corporations $=»613(2) 
Statement of company's owner that he 
had not received notice from Secretary of 
State as to revocation of company's articles 
of association due to failure to file reports 
was insufficient to overcome presumption 
that mail regularly sent from office of Sec-
retary of State was received at corporate 
offices listed on prior reports. 
3. Corporations <s»391, 392 
Those who seek to insulate themselves 
from liability by using corporate form of 
business enterprise have responsibility to 
see that reports are duly filed and that 
attorney for service of process is appoint-
ed. 
4. Corporations ^=392 
If attorney appointed for service of 
process on corporation is deceased, corpo-
rate officers have responsibility to appoint 
new one so that Secretary of States office 
may always have responsible party to 
whom tn Rpnd annrooriate notices. 
